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ENFORCING THE CONTRACT TO BARGAIN
CHARLES L. KNAPP*
Recognizing the common law's reluctance to enforce an "agree-
ment to agree," as distinguished from a binding contract, the author
introduces the concept of a "contract to bargain" and seeks to jus-
tify its judicial recognition as a legally enforceable agreement. Argu-
ing from the intention of the parties, the author finds that a period
of preliminary negotiations often gives rise to a mutual commitment
to bargain in good faith to complete the contract. Specific provi-
sions as well as the broad policy of the Uniform Commercial Code
are relied upon to justify this approach. A detailed analysis of a
numnber of cases reveals the applicability of this construct and in-
dicates the probable effect of its acceptance on the law. While it
is recognized that it may be difficult to fashion an appropriate rem-
edy for breach of a "contract to bargain," the case law demon-
strates the dilemma confronting a court which does not recognize
a middle ground between a completed contract and no contract
at all.
INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose and Scope of the Study
T HE main theme of the discussion which follows will be that
the common law has failed to deal adequately with many cases
in which the parties to a negotiation have reached partial agree-
ment on the terms of their eventual exchange. Such a thesis obvi-
ously requires some indulgence on the reader's part, and a certain
amount of irreverence as well; to put the reader in the proper
frame of mind it may be well to begin with two selections from
Professor Corbin's treatise, probably the single most authoritative
work in the area of contract law today:
Frequently agreements are arrived at piecemeal, different terms
and items being discussed and agreed upon separately. As long
as the parties know that there is an essential term not yet agreed
on, there is no contract; the preliminary agreements on specific
items are mere preliminary negotiation building up the terms of the
final offer that may or may not be made.... Further illustrations
are to be found in the so-called contract to make a contract....
If the document or contract that the parties agree to make is to
contain any material term that is not already agreed on, no con-
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. BA., 1956, Denison
University; LL.B., 1960, New York University.
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tract has yet been made; and the so-called "contract to make a
contract" is not a contract at all.'
No one can go to the moon.2
The common law of contracts assumes in general that there is
a clear theoretical distinction between what the law calls a "con-
tract" and the relation between those who have merely entered
negotiations looking to the formation of a contract. The important
difference between the initial stage of preliminary negotiation and
the state of contract itself is, of course, that in the latter each
party has enforceable rights against the other. Even though these
rights may be conditional, and may never become rights to im-
mediate performance, they nevertheless exist in the contemplation
of the law-and they exist as soon as the contract comes into
being.
3
Correlative to (but not necessarily dictated by) the proposi-
tion that creation of a contract relation results in the immediate
existence of rights, is the converse: until the stage of contract is
reached, no rights exist because none have been created. One
common expression of this proposition is the rule that an offer may
be withdrawn at any time until its acceptance, with no liability
on the part of the withdrawing offeror.4 To be accurate, this
statement needs, of course, to be qualified: first, by recognizing
that an offer may be accepted in a number of different ways, so
that a commencement of performance may in some circumstances
amount to acceptance; "5 second, by the reminder that an offer
1 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 29, at 82-85 (rev. ed. 1963).
2 6 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1325, at 337 (rev. ed. 1963). The quoted language
is found in the course of an explanation of the term "objective impossibility,"
and-in one sense, at least-was true when written. Professor Corbin was of course
all too aware of the obvious point being made here. See Bibliography of the
Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74 Yale LJ. 311 n.1 (1964).
3 The Uniform Commercial Code contains the following language: "An agree-
ment sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the
moment of its making is undetermined." Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(2)
(1962) (hereinafter cited as UCC). This flexible-sounding provision was apparently
not intended to contradict the basic assumption that there is a single point in time
when the parties cross the line from non-contract to contract; an earlier version of
this provision, somewhat more susceptible to different interpretation ("Conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish
a contract for sale even though the moment of its making cannot be determined."),
was revised after disapproval by the New York State Law Revision Commission.
N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code
(Legis. Doc. No. 65A) (1956).
4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 41 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); set
generally 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 38 (rev. ed. 1963).
5 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 29, 31, 55, 56 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964). See Calo, Inc. v. AMF Pinspotters, Inc., 31 Ill. App. 2d 2, 176 N.E.2d 1
(1961).
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may have been "paid for" with some kind of consideration suffi-
cient to raise it, at least for a specified period, to the status of an
irrevocable offer (meaning that the offeree has the power uni-
laterally to create the offered contract despite an intervening com-
munication by the offeror of his unwillingness to complete the
contemplated exchange of performances);6 and third, by noting
that in some types of cases the courts have been willing to say
that a clear and definite offer made in circumstances in which
reliance is known to the offeror to be likely may not be withdrawn
-at least not without some duty of compensation-where such
reliance has occurred and is substantial.7 Underlying many of
these legal rules is the general rule that existence of a binding
relation of reciprocal rights and duties between the parties to a
prospective exchange transaction depends on the existence of a
contract 8 Thus, for a common law lawyer, characterizing a
particular negotiation situation is likely to be a choice between
two alternatives-contract or no-contract.
To some extent, the rigidity of the conceptual distinction thus
maintained is weakened by garden-variety "legal realism," which
readily admits that a court's decision on the question of whether
a contract has been created will in some immeasurable but im-
portant respect depend on the "moral" or "ethical" quality of the
conduct of the parties with respect to the particular transaction
in dispute.9 Nevertheless, when the dispute is resolved, the court's
decision will probably be based on one of two fundamental con-
clusions: that no contractual rights had been created (and thus
none could have been violated); or that the agreement between
the parties had reached the stage of a complete and binding con-
tract.
0 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 35A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89B(1) and Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1965).
7 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89B(2), Comment e, (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1965). See text accompany notes 45-50 infra.
8 The offer made irrevocable by justifiable reliance can be viewed as just
another species of "contract," formed by a valid acceptance of a still open offer.
However, it may be more accurate to view this situation, as well as the related
case of unbargained reliance on a gratuitous promise, as an exception to the general
rule referred to in the text, especially since partial enforcement is now dearly
sanctioned as possibly sufficient in both cases. Compare Id. § 89B(2), Comment e
and § 90, Comment e with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1964).
9 That judges are not immune from weighing the parties as well as their dis-
pute, see 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 1, at 3 (rev. ed. 1963). His assumption that
"in our country, it is the comparatively poor who determine what the law is"
may be somewhat harder to maintain today, however. For a grimmer view, see
Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 115 (1969).
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The distinction between contract and non-contract could be
phrased in another way, based on the presence or absence of
legally enforceable duties. The person who becomes a party to
a contract assumes a duty to go forward with the contemplated
transaction. This duty may be inchoate, may be dependent on
some measure of initial performance from the other party, and
may even be destroyed by changing circumstances or by the other
party's breach of duty. Nevertheless, initially it exists, and the
contractor's freedom of action is curtailed thereby-so much so
that his mere statement of intention not to be bound by the con-
tract (i.e., not "to go forward") may amount to an immediate and
total breach of contract, giving the other party a right to damages
calculated with reference to the full expectation value of the
contemplated exchange of performances."0 One who is not yet
bound by a contract, however, has no such duty to go forward.
He is at liberty to withdraw completely from the proposed trans-
action at any time, for any reason. He may choose to enter into
a substitute transaction of a similar nature with some third party,
or, indeed, to refrain from action altogether-in either case with-
out being answerable to the abandoned party for any disappoint-
ment to the latter's expectations, however severe this may have
been.'-
Such at least would be the view of the common law. It seems
likely, however, that there are in fact many situations in which at
some stage of negotiations the views of the negotiating parties as
to their own "duty to go forward" would be somewhere between
the two extremes described. Most of these cases would be among
those customarily put in two of the traditional pigeonholes of con-
tract law-the "agreement to agree" cases12 and the "formal
contract contemplated" cases. 3 The first of these categories is
comprised primarily of transactions which have reached the stage
of full agreement on many, perhaps most, terms of the proposed
exchange of performances, plus agreement that an agreement
should and probably will later be reached on the remaining terms.
The second category includes those cases in which agreement has
10 Restatement of Contracts §§ 318, 338 (1932).
11 Of course, if the disappointment is occasioned by the offeree's substantial,
foreseeable reliance, he may have some remedy. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
12 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 32 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964);
I A. Corbin, Contracts § 30 (rev. ed. 1963) ; G. Grismore, Contracts § 20 (rev. ed.
1965) ; L. Simpson, Contracts §§ 45, 46 (2d ed. 1965); 1 S. Williston, Contracts
§ 45 (3d ed. 1957).
13 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964);
1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 30 (rev. ed 1963); G. Grismore, Contracts § 20 (rev. ed.
1965) ; L. Simpson, Contracts § 17 (2d ed. 1965); 1 S. Vfliston, Contracts
f§ 28, 28A (3d ed. 1957).
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been reached on many terms of the proposed exchange (probably
at least enough to suggest that the parties considered the extent
of remaining potential disagreement to be negligible), but it is
nevertheless evident that the parties to the negotiation expected
to sign later a detailed, formal, written document containing all
the terms earlier agreed upon.
In each of these situations, the common law court considers
the basic question to be whether at the time the dispute arose a
contract had been made.14 In the "agreement to agree" case, the
parties often have failed to achieve "contract" status simply
because they did not reach a bargain complete and final enough to
be worthy of (and capable of) legal recognition and enforce-
ment."s The intention of the parties not to have a binding contract
is perhaps clear, but not of crucial importance. 6 In the "formal
contract contemplated" situation, however, the parties may have
arrived at an agreement complete enough to satisfy even a de-
manding court, but the court is wary of enforcing the agreement
because it doubts that the parties really intended their promises
to be initially enforceable. 7 Here the intention of the parties as
to enforceability is said to be of paramount importance.'8
The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code have under-
taken to amend basic rules of contract law in a number of areas
where courts have unjustifiably imposed on innocent businessmen
the judges' own ideas of what does or does not constitute a suffi-
ciently complete contract.1 9 In line with this approach they have
modified the "agreement to agree" rule to a considerable degree,
so that now under the Code a contract may be found despite a
substantial degree of "indefiniteness." 0 The "written contract
contemplated" rule, on the other hand, survives today in much
the same form as when it was first enunciated.2" This may be due
14 The author of this article cannot pretend to have read all the reported
decions of such cases, or even all those cited in the treatises referred to in notes
12 and 13 supra. In the discussion which follows, recent cases illustrative of princi-
ples stated in the text will be cited as examples; additional case citations can be
be found in those authorities.
15 See note 27 infra for recent examples.
16 See Restatement of Contracts § 32 (1932).
17 See note 34 infra for recent examples.
1s See Restatement of Contracts § 26 (1932).
19 E.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Bake-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619
(1915); see UCC § 2-207.
20 UCC § 2-204(3). The revised Restatement does give considerably more
weight to intention, following the lead of the Code. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 32 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); see Braucher, Offer and Acceptance
in the Second Restatement, 74 Yale L.J. 302, 307-0 (1964).
21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964) sub-
stantially duplicates the original; however, Comment c (note) adds a number of
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to the fact that it appears by its very nature to give effect to the
real intention of the parties, rather than ignoring it.
It is suggested that in a number of cases, the "agreement to
agree" rule-even as liberalized by the U.C.C.-and the "written
contract contemplated" rule both run counter to the intentions
and expectations of the parties at the time of the transaction
under scrutiny. This is because the common law's dichotomy of
contract/no-contract does not exhaust the catalog of possible
intentions.
There is of course no absolute necessity for making the rules
of law coextensive with the parties' ideas of what these rules
should be. There are many kinds of conduct most people would
label as somehow "wrong," which are neither criminal nor
tortious.22 While "promises should be kept" is a moral stricture
of rather general acceptance, the law of contract in general singles
out only the "bargained-for" promise as worthy of organized
protection.23
This insistence on a "bargain," however, does suggest a
reason for conforming the law to the private moral code of the
parties in the cases under discussion. The Uniform Commercial
Code, which, if only by the near-universality of its adoption, must
be taken as the most authoritative statement of current American
commercial law, purports to be a businessman's code, doing away
with "outmoded" rules of law to the extent that they diverge from
what businessmen regard as appropriate norms of conduct. In
general, it makes a greater effort than the common law to provide
means for discovering and following business custom.2 4 Indeed,
although it does contain some attempts to define and differentiate
the consumer transaction, z the Code is generally indifferent to
guidelines for determining the parties' probable intention. These principles, derived
from Mississippi & Dominion S.S. Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248, 259 A. 1063, 1067
(1894), were included in response to Professor Llewellyn's criticism of the Restate-
ment rule as originally formulated. See Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer
and Acceptance, I, 48 Yale L.J. 1, 14 n.29 (1938).
22 See W. Prosser, Torts § 11 (3d ed. 1964).
23 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 75, Comments a, b and c (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1965).
24 UCC §§ 1-205, 2-208; see Levie, Trade Usage and Custom under the Com-
mon Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1101 (1965).
25 The Code nowhere defines "consumer." It does distinguish in article 9
between "consumer goods" and other goods used as collateral, and provides some
slight additional protection of various kinds to persons purchasing or borrowing
against such items. UCC §§ 9-109(1), 9-204(4)(b), 9-206(1), 9-307(2), 9-505(1),
9-507(1). There is also some slight protection in article 2 against disclaimer of
warranties on goods sold to consumers. UCC §§ 2-318, 2-719(3). Section 2-302,
the "unconscionability" dause, has of course been most often employed in situa-
tions where one party was a consumer and the other a merchant. See Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485,
547-48 (1967).
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the consumer;20 the "normal" transaction for Code purposes is an
arms-length bargain between competent and experienced business-
men.
The Code thus seeks to follow the businessman into the
marketplace, and shape decisions to the facts and norms of busi-
ness life. If a class of transactions exists in which the law as
presently conceived and administered fails to accomplish this
goal, then certainly the Code, and perhaps the common law as
well, should attempt to adjust existing rules to accommodate to
the facts of business life.
The hypothesis here will be that such a class of transactions
does exist: that in at least a substantial number of the "agreement
to agree" and "formal contract contemplated" cases, the parties
-at the relevant stage of negotiations-do consider themselves
"morally" or "ethically" bound, but only in a limited way.
In the typical "agreement to agree" case, the parties have
clearly intended to make some sort of "bargain" -they con-
template an exchange of performances, not simply a one-sided,
gratuitous transfer. However, for some reason, they have post-
poned a present decision on one or more details of that exchange,
such as the time for performance, the precise price to be paid, the
terms of payment, or the amounts or varieties of particular goods
to be furnished within an overall agreed amount-the possible
range of such items is as broad as the whole scope of contracting
activity.
At this stage of negotiation, there are a number of possible
states of mind which the negotiating parties may have on the
question of whether each is "bound" to the other (using "bound"
here in the sense of bound by what each would regard as good
business ethics):
(1) Each may regard himself and his opposite number as
perfectly free for any reason whatsoever to refuse to reach agree-
ment on the outstanding points, and to withdraw from the trans-
action without being bound to proceed farther with the exchange
(except to pay some reasonable amount for any performance
which may have already been rendered and received). This is
also apt to be the answer of traditional contract common law to
the question of whether any legally enforceable bond has been
created: that no contract has yet come into existence,2 7 and thus
26 See Note, Consumer Perspective and Consumer Sales Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 21 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 241 (1966).
27 E.g., National Tea Co. v. Weiss, 341 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1965); Merritt-
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 305 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1962); Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. D'Onfro, 2S2 F.2d 175 (lst Cir. 1960); Pacific Hills
Corp. v. Duggan, 199 Cal. App. 2d 806, 19 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
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no rights exist other than those arising from a duty to make
restitution for benefits actually received.28 No expectation dam-
ages can be recovered, because no reasonable expectations have
yet been created; 29 no reliance damages can be recovered, because
no reliance on such an incomplete transaction is deserving of
protection .
0
(2) Each may regard himself and his opposite number as
being fully bound to the proposed exchange unless an excuse exists
which would have been sufficient to excuse performance of an
ordinary executory contract. Under this view even an eventual
failure to reach agreement on the "postponed" points would not
of itself be sufficient justification for withdrawal; an impartial
arbiter could properly decree the standard of performance in the
remaining areas of non-agreement. On the question of whether
any legally enforceable bond has been created, this second view
might also be the answer given by traditional contract law,31
based on the assumption that the agreement of the parties is com-
plete, though imperfectly expressed. On any matters left open the
parties should, if necessary, be bound in accordance with a stan-
Compare with John I. Moss, Inc. v. Cobbs Co., 198 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Professional Facilities Corp. v. Marks, 373 Mich. 673, 131 N.W.2d 60
(1964) ; Hansen v. Catsman, 371 Mich. 79, 123 N.W.2d 265 (1963) ; cf. JMR, Inc.
v. Hedderly, 261 Cal. App. 2d 144, 67 Cal. Rptr. 742 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In
Lombardo v. Gasparini Excavating Co., 385 Pa. 388, 123 A.2d 663 (1956), a settle-
ment contract based on forebearance to sue for breach of an "agreement to agree"
was held unsupported by consideration.
28 John I. Moss, Inc. v. Cobbs Co., 198 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967) (held that the trial court wrongly dismissed plaintiff's complaint seeking re-
turn of a "franchise fee" paid in connection with a franchise made by plaintiff
and later withdrawn).
29 There is some authority for the proposition that a joint venture agreement
may be too indefinite to constitute an enforceable contract and yet give rise to
some kind of action for breach of fiduciary duty, based on wrongful appropriation
of business opportunity; plaintiff's remedy may be computed with reference to the
profit he would have made on the proposed joint venture. Air Technology Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 347 Mass. 613, 199 N.E.2d 538 (1964) ; accord, Mitchell v. Hart,
41 F.R.D. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Contra, Pacific Hills Corp. v. Duggan, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 806, 19 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
30 Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616 (D. Ore. 1967). In
Stewart v. Schmauss, 191 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 1966), plaintiff was apparently
allowed to recover sums he expended in reliance on a lease agreement, despite the
fact that the agreement itself was not binding; the court referred to La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1969) as a basis for its decision.
31 E.g., Muth v. J.W. Speaker Corp., 151 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Wis. 1957), aff'd,
262 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1959); Comerata v. Chaumont, Inc., 52 N.J. Super. 299,
145 A.2d 471 (1958) (plaintiff who sued for return of deposit pursuant to contract
failed to show a breach by defendant and was thus apparently in breach herself;
plaintiff permitted to seek a remedy in restitution upon remand); John W. Rouse
Constr. Corp. v. Albany Acoustical Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 38, 189 N.Y.S.2d 532
(3d Dep't 1959).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 44:673
HeinOnline -- 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 680 1969
October 1969] ENFORCING THE CONTRACT TO BARGAIN
dard to be set either by some designated impartial third party
or by a court 2 This approach overcomes the objection that the
agreement is too incomplete by finding it no more incomplete than
many other perfectly unremarkable commercial contracts in which
one or more terms of performance have to be supplied by the
court in deciding questions of enforcement 3
(3) Finally, it is possible that each of the negotiating parties
really regards himself and the other party not as completely
bound, but nonetheless as "committed to the deal," and bound
to the extent actual agreement is eventually reached. The parties
are bound to try in good faith to reach some agreement and not to
withdraw from the proposed exchange for any reason other than
the eventual failure to reach such agreement. Implicit in this view
of the facts are a number of assumptions: (1) that each party to
the negotiations considers the proposed exchange beneficial and
has indicated to the other that he can properly be regarded as
"committed" to it; (2) that there is a mutual recognition by the
parties that important points of substance remain to be decided
at some later time, possibly in the light of changing or emergent
conditions, but that an immediate decision on such matters would
be premature and possibly damaging to one party or the other if
conditions should develop in an unanticipated way; (3) and
finally, that both parties regard the points remaining to be decided
as being potential "deal-upsetters"--so material that failure to
reach agreement must excuse further performance.
This third view of the transaction is one which has no com-
mon law counterpart. If the parties are legally bound to each
other, then they have impliedly agreed to submit to the court's
judgment any terms which for some reason they omitted, left
unclear, or reserved for future agreement. If the parties have
not so bound themselves, however, they are not bound at all-no
contract exists, only an "agreement to agree," and each party is
B2 Muth v. J.W. Speaker, Corp., 151 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Wis. 1957), aff'd,
262 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1959) (cancellation clause missing in patent licensing agree-
ment; court holds the agreement terminates with the life of the patent) ; John W.
Rouse Constr. Corp. v. Albany Acoustical Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 38, 189 N.Y.S.2d
532 (3d Dep't 1959) (time for performance not stated in construction sub-contract;
not too indefinite for enforcement) ; cf. Citizens Utils. Co. v. Wheeler, 156 Cal. App.
2d 423, 319 P.2d 763 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (court could supply missing terms in
stocks sale contract); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., 16 IIl. 2d 234,
156 N.E.2d 513 (1958) (court could supply missing terms in employment contract
in order to enforce specifically that agreement and related sale of assets; this case
is discussed in the text accompanying note 147 infra).
33 See 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 95, nn.9 & 10 (rev. ed 1963). As will be
discussed below, this also appears to be the approach of UCC § 2-305, regarding
agreements in which "the price is not settled."
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free at any time, and for any reason, to say "I choose to go no
farther with this deal."
In the typical "formal contract contemplated" case, the
parties have clearly intended a bargain; they have also reached
the stage of agreement on at least a number of the material terms
of the proposed exchange. However, for some reason, they both
apparently contemplate the later execution of a full, formal
written document. At this stage of the negotiations, there are
once again a number of possible views which the parties may en-
tertain as to the extent to which each of them is "bound," by good
business ethics, to the proposed exchange of performances:
(1) Each may regard himself as not bound to anything at
all unless and until a formal writing is signed by him, and, further,
as being free to refuse to sign that writing for any reason what-
soever. This is one possible view which the law may take as to the
extent of the obligation created by the negotiations to date-
none at all. 4 A legal conclusion of this sort, which will be pre-
sented as the reflection of the parties' intention, is made more
likely by the presence of factors such as the following: a) the
contract is of a type which requires writing for enforceability
under the Statute of Frauds; b) the contract contemplated in-
volves large sums of money; c) the contract has many details; d)
the contract is an unusual one, for which a standard form is not
available or appropriate; e) the parties were apparently unwilling
to proceed with any performance until the formal document was
prepared and signedY5 There are many cases in which it is im-
possible to believe that the parties intended any liability to attach
34 E.g., Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616 (D. Ore. 1967),
Ashton v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Thrift Shop, Inc. v.
Alaska Mut. Say. Bank, 398 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1965); Louis Lesser Enterprises,
Ltd. v. Roeder, 209 Cal. App. 2d 401, 25 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Apablasa v. Merrit & Co., 176 Cal. App. 2d 719, 1 Cal. Rptr. 500 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); Carter v. Milestone, 170 Cal. App. 2d 189, 338 P.2d 569 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); Brause v. Goldman, 10 App. Div. 2d 328, 199 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1st Dep't
1960); Horton v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 255 N.C. 675, 122 S.E.2d 716 (1961);
Larson v. Western Underwriters, Inc., 87 N.W.2d 883 (S.D. 1958); Premier Oil
Ref. Co. v. Bates, 367 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Occasionally the court's
conclusion is just impossible to accept; see, e.g., Beta Sigma Tau v. Shrine Civic
Auditorium, 159 Cal. App. 2d 281, 323 P.2d 496 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958), a case in
which plaintiff at least appears to have qualified for protection under Restatement
of Contracts § 90 (1932).
35 Such factors are referred to in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26,
Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); cf. note 21, supra. Brause v. Goldman,
10 App. Div. 2d 328, 199 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1st Dep't 1960), also involved the Statute
of Frauds; all the other factors mentioned appear to be present in Michigan Broad-
casting Co. v. Shawd, 352 Mich. 453, 90 NV.2d 451 (1958).
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to either side until final execution of the contemplated formal
document.3
(2) Each party may really feel that the "formal" document
is only a "formality"-some sort of ritual, desirable for one or
more reasons, but in no sense a prerequisite to a "binding" agree-
ment.
This second view is, again, not an unlikely one for the law
to adopt on the issue of whether in a particular case a binding
legal obligation has been created.37 The likelihood of such an
outcome is increased where: a) no independent policy of the law
requires a writing for enforceability, or, if it does, the parties have
exchanged letters, telegrams or other writings in which the agreed-
upon terms are sufficiently reflected; b) the proposed contract
appears relatively simple, and does not involve long-term obliga-
tions; c) the contemplated "formal" contract is a standard-form
document, which itself contains the details necessary for a con-
tract of this sort; or d) the parties themselves, without waiting
for the formality of execution, have proceeded to perform, in a
way that suggests they believed full and binding agreement to
have been reached 8
In each of the two preceding characterizations of the "formal
contract contemplated" situation, the parties may have actually
reached agreement on every detail of their proposed exchange. In
any such case where at the relevant point in negotiation there
30 Occasionally a carefully drafted agreement will clarify the parties' intention
in this respect; e.g., Smissaert v. Chiodo, 163 Cal. App. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 98 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); Brause v. Goldman, 10 App. Div. 2d 328, 199 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1st Dep't 1960); but see Brassteel Mfg. Co. v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 21 Misc.
2d 343, 192 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (clause stating "this represents our under-
standing and working agreement until legalized by appropriate contract" held
merely to create an ambiguity, to be resolved against the defendant drafter whose
motion to dismiss should therefore be denied). In some cases the parties may sim-
ply have little or no intention at all on the question; see, e.g., Lemoine v. Goudeau,
127 So. 2d 207 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
37 E.g., Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Elec. Co., 356 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1966);
American Aeronautics Corp. v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 69,
317 P.2d 694 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Jaybe Constr. Co. v. Beco, Inc., 216 A.2d
203 (Conn. Ct. App. 1965); Karson v. Arnow, 32 Misc. 2d 499, 224 N.Y.S.2d 891
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
38 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964). Very substantial performance had been rendered in Karson v. Arnow, 32
Mlisc. 2d 499, 224 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1962), American Aeronautics Corp. v.
Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 69, 317 P.2d 694 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
In Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Elec. Co., 356 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1966) immediate
performance was clearly called for by defendant. Absence of a "standard form"
was influential in Carter v. Milestone, 170 Cal. App. 2d 139, 338 P.2d 569 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1959), a no-contract case.
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remain terms on which agreement has not been expressly reached,
there is yet a third possibility.
(3) It is possible that the principals have carried the "deal"
as far as they can, and that they are relying on their agents
(almost always including lawyers, but possibly also accountants
and other experts) to complete the process of agreement. In this
view of the facts, the purpose of preparing the formal document is
not simply to postpone creation of an obligation, or even to pro-
vide evidence of its existence or terms, but rather to afford these
experts an opportunity to add to the total agreement such pro-
tection against various risks as they think necessary or prudent.
On this assumption, the principals are likely to feel ethically
bound to the outlines of the deal as they have hammered it out,
the withdrawal of either one based simply on dissatisfaction with
those outlines being regarded by both as admittedly unjustified.
The principals, however, are likely to consider themselves still
morally free to withdraw if and when it should appear that the
"second team" of bargainers have raised a substantial issue on
which they are unable to agree and which the principals, when
apprised of the difficulty, are likewise unable to resolve.
As with the "agreement to agree" discussed above, this third,
middle view of the intention of the parties has no common law
counterpart. It is similar to the first view in that the execution of
a formal writing, or, at least, full agreement on each of its terms,
is the point at which the completely binding contract is created. In
the eyes of the parties, however, a significant narrowing of the
"moral right" to withdraw has occurred at a much earlier time
(although immediate commencement of performance is still to be
viewed as risky, in light of the continuing possibility of eventual
disagreement followed by justified withdrawal).
B. The Contract to Bargain
The preceding discussion has preserved the distinction be-
tween the "agreement to agree" situation and the "formal-con-
tract-contemplated" situation, resting the distinction on the nature
of the reason for delaying agreement: where the delay is to await
the occurrence of further events which control the future agree-
ment, the relationship is termed an "agreement to agree"; where
the delay is to permit negotiations which will settle the details of a
transaction already fully agreed upon in its "essential" terms, the
case has been referred to as one where a "formal contract" is
"contemplated." Of course, the boundary between the two cate-
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gories is not always clearly ascertainable, and a given case may
well be characterized as falling in either-or indeed, in both 9
For our purposes, therefore, it will be sufficient to further
describe and define the two "middle" positions outlined above, in
order to stress the essential similarity between them and the dif-
ference between these two categories and other, more conventional
analyses. Thus, it has been suggested that in each of the two
hypothetical cases above, the parties have reached agreement to
such a degree that they regard themselves as bound to each other
to the extent that neither can withdraw for an "unjustified" rea-
son, and yet still free enough that neither will be compelled to
perform if-after good faith bargaining-actual agreement can-
not be reached. This situation, if recognized at law in the manner
suggested, might be most accurately denominated a "contract to
bargain." This nomenclature seems accurate for the following
reasons: (1) Use of the word "contract" stresses the fact that the
relationship, to at least some extent, entails binding obligations,
the breach of which will give rise to a legal remedy4 0 (2) Use of
the term "bargain" emphasizes that such a contract imposes
neither an absolute duty to perform the contemplated exchange,
nor even an absolute duty to agree to perform it. Rather it creates
a present duty to "bargain"i-to engage, in good faith, in the pro-
cess of attempting to reach agreement on the terms of the pro-
posed exchange, for as long as may reasonably be required under
the circumstances.41
As used herein, therefore, the term "contract to bargain" will
be used to describe any situation where two or more parties have
commenced negotiations looking toward a particular exchange,
have reached actual agreement on some important terms of the
proposed exchange, have delayed agreement on other terms of
real importance, but have nevertheless mutually signified their
willingness to be regarded as "committed" to the entire proposed
exchange. Each regards withdrawal by the other-for a reason
39 E.g., Louis Lesser Enterprises, Ltd. v. Roeder, 209 Cal. App. 2d 401, 25
Cal. Rptr. 917 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Citizens Utils. Co. v. Wheeler, 156 Cal.
App. 2d 423, 319 P.2d 763 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
40 The UCC distinguishes between the terms "agreement" and "contract,"
using the former to refer to the bargain of the parties and the latter to mean the
legal obligation created thereby. UCC § 1-201(3), (11).
41 Use of the verb form "to bargain" (rather than "contract of bargain" or
just "bargain contract") is intentional, in the hope of stressing the process of bar-
gaining which remains to be performed, rather than the agreement (if any) which
will result therefrom.
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other than failure to reach agreement on the remaining points-
as unjustified, and worthy of both moral and legal condemnation.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE CONTRACT TO BARGAIN
A. Case Law
The preceding discussion has served to demonstrate that the
common law has been not so much resistant as oblivious to the
notion that there might be an enforceable contract to bargain. Is
there any reason to think that the courts might prove receptive
to the analysis outlined above? The answer suggested here is that
some authority exists for the duty to bargain as a legally enforce-
able obligation, that, more importantly, the Uniform Commercial
Code furnishes ample room for any judge so disposed to grant
enforceable status to the contract to bargain, and that important
policies would indeed be furthered by such a decision.
The judicial authority referred to is found in Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc., a Wisconsin case decided in 1965.42 Plain-
tiff Hoffman, the owner of a small bakery shop, was interested in
becoming the operator of a supermarket. He entered into negotia-
tions with defendant Red Owl, a company with a chain of super-
markets around the state. Receiving assurances that the amount
of capital he proposed would be sufficient to enable him to estab-
lish and operate a Red Owl store, Hoffman undertook-at defen-
dant's urging-a series of actions aimed at the eventual establish-
ment of a supermarket business. He sold his bakery, bought a
small grocery store (to gain experience in this field), sold the
grocery store, and purchased an option on a lot in the town where
he contemplated opening his store. Hoffman's sad tale ended when
Red Owl insisted on his furnishing more capital than he had
available, on terms different from those originally proposed. He
then brought an action seeking damages for the refusal of defen-
dant to honor its commitments made during the process of negoti-
ation. The trial court awarded judgment for the plaintiff, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court (although disapproving the trial court's
computation of damages) approved the decision on the basis of
a principle which had received little or no application in Wiscon-
sin-Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, the so-called
"promissory estoppel" section.4" This section generally states that
a promise should be enforced where it should reasonably have
been foreseen by the promisor that substantial reliance by the
42 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 NAV.2d 267 (1965).
43 Id. at 693-99, 133 N.V.2d at 272-75.
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promisee would follow, if as a result of such reliance injustice
can be prevented only by enforcing the promise in some manner."'
If one were to find any authority for the principle that a
contract to bargain may give rise to enforceable rights, the still-
developing area of promissory estoppel would at first appear to
be a likely source. Traditionally non-traditional, promissory es-
toppel has steadily expanded from its modest beginnings,45 and
has provided remedies for many plaintiffs who could not have
qualified for relief under more conventional contract analysis. 6
Furthermore, an initial obstacle to the free employment of promis-
sory estoppel has been removed by the apparent consensus of
authority-after some initial opinion to the contrary47-that pro-
tection of reliance is not confined to the case of the "gratuitous"
promise.48 Promissory estoppel is now employed with increasing
frequency in what are essentially commercial, "bargaining" situa-
tions; indeed, this principle has been used to justify the awarding
of a remedy in a number of cases where a bargain was under
negotiation but no final agreement had been reached. 9
These cases do not, however, furnish much authority for the
recognition of a contract to bargain. They are generally referred
to as the "firm offer" cases, and they turn on the question of
44 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) provides
as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may
be limited as justice requires.
The protection of third-party reliance and the suggestion of partial enforcement are
new in this version; see Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932).
45 See Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 908
(1937).
40 See generally Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50
Mich. L. Rev. 639, 873 (1952).
47 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (opinion by
Learned Hand, J.); see generally Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and
Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 491-93 (1950); Schultz, The
Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry,
19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237 (1952).
48 E.g., Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958)
(opinion by Traynor, J.); see Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Con-
tracts, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 312, 839-43 (1961). See generally, Note, Once Around the
Flag Pole: Construction Bidding and Contracts at Formation, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
316 (1964).
49 E.g., N. Litterio & Co., v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir.
1963) ; Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237 Ark. 583, 374 S.W2d 818 (1964) ;
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958); E. A. Coronis
Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90 N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (App. Div.
1966).
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whether reliance on an offer before acceptance is sufficient to
make the offer irrevocable or, at least, to give the offeree a right
to compensation for his expenses incurred in reliance, where the
offer is thereafter withdrawn before acceptance. The "firm offer"
cases fail to support the thesis only because the courts have gen-
erally assumed, when deciding this type of case for the plaintiff,
that the defendant had made an "offer"-a manifestation of con-
tractual intent so definite that nothing remains for the formation
of a binding contract but the offeree's manifestation of accept-
ance50
In contrast to those cases, our analysis of the contract to
bargain has stressed the fact that the parties have not yet reached
the stage where all terms are settled, and only a final assent is
lacking. The courts have held that one cannot claim the protec-
tion of section 90 if he has relied on a promise which was illusory.,"
The firm offer cases similarly suggest that one cannot justifiably
rely on an offer unless it is an "offer" in the conventional sense-
final and complete in all its terms.' 2 If so, then, section 90 falls
short of conferring enforceable status on the contract to bargain.
There may of course be cases where the principle of requir-
ing a definite offer as the basis for reliance was in fact strained
beyond the breaking point. The importance of the Hoffman case,
however, lies as much in the way the decision is explained as in
the decision itself. With commendable candor, the court makes
no attempt to obscure the fact that the parties had not reached
final agreement on all material terms when the deal fell through.
The defendant thus could not be said to have made an offer so
definite that plaintiff, simply by accepting, could cause a contract
to come into being. The court compensated plaintiff for his reli-
ance on defendant's assurance not that agreement had been
reached, but only that it would be reached-and on terms satis-
factory to the plaintiff.
It is thus reasonable to interpret Hoffman as furnishing
authority for the proposition that one may in some circumstances
come under a duty to bargain in good faith, breach of which duty
may result in liability for damages, at least to the extent of com-
pensating the detrimental reliance of the injured party." Certain
5o E.g., the court in E. A. Coronis Associates v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 90
N.J. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (App. Div. 1966), listed "a clear and definite offer"
from defendant as a prerequisite to relief for plaintiff on a promissory estoppel
theory. 90 N.J. Super. at 79, 216 A.2d at 252.
51 Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955).
52 See note So supra; cf. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d
736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
53 Knapp, Contracts, 1966 Ann. Survey Am. L. 133, 142; Note, 51 Cornell L.Q.
351 (1966).
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questions do arise, however, in the course of attempting to fit the
Hoffman case into the pattern of a contract to bargain, as pre-
viously defined. First, it is not clear from the opinion whether the
principle of recovery there announced may be restricted to cases
in which there is some kind of bargaining imbalance which gives
the plaintiff a claim to extra indulgence from the court, beyond
that to which a businessman bargaining as an equal would be
entitled. Although the decision is not based expressly upon
such factors, it is difficult to escape an initial impression that
Hoffman appeared to the court as a sort of babe in the Wisconsin
woods, dealing with a bunch of city slickers from the Red Owl
gang. The court may thus have protected Hoffman against risks
which it would have expected an experienced businessman to bear
himself.0 4 The concept of a contract to bargain does not, however,
require either party to demonstrate his naivete, but merely regard
withdrawal as dishonorable. It may of course be argued that for
each party to expect the other to be honorable is naivete in its
purest form. The U.C.C., however, clearly views business honor
as the product not of innocence, but of experience-it is a stan-
dard of conduct created by the business world itself, over a period
of time, out of countless business transactions.
A second problem in characterizing the Hoffman negotiations
is the difficulty in evaluating the extent of actual agreement
reached by the parties and the degree to which they manifested
their commitment to the proposed exchange of performances. It
is possible, for instance, that the court in Hoffman could have con-
cluded that plaintiff really believed that the deal was finally
agreed upon, or at least that the negotiations were so advanced
as to amount to a contract fully binding in all respects. Even
more likely, from the facts described by the court, is the possi-
bility that the manifestations of "commitment," on which the
decision largely depends, came principally from Red Owl rather
than from Hoffman. If so, had the tables been turned and Hoff-
man been the one who backed out of the agreement, he would not
have been liable to Red Owl. 6
54 E.g., Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616 (D. Ore. 1967).
See Knapp, Contracts, 1966 Ann. Survey Am. L. 133, 143 (a statement of views to
some extent inconsistent with those advanced generally herein; referred to here
principally to acknowledge the inconsistency).
GG In the case of a "merchant," "good faith" under Article 2 of the U.C.C.
includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." UCC § 2-103(1) (b).
GO Cf. John I. Moss, Inc. v. Cobbs Co., 198 So. 2d 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967) (franchise applicant permitted to recover franchise fee where plaintiff's
president withdrew from proposed franchise agreement solely "for personal rea-
sons").
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Whatever its consequences in terms of legal recognition of
rights and granting of remedies, the contract to bargain is basic-
ally a bilateral arrangement; its claim for legal recognition is
principally based upon the contention that there are cases where
a level of agreement has been reached, and manifested, which is
sufficient in the eyes of the parties themselves to bind them, ab-
sent good faith justification for withdrawal. A fundamental char-
acteristic of promissory estoppel is its one-sidedness-only one
party having enforceable rights against the other.17 In that re-
spect, Hoffman, if it is truly a promissory estoppel situation, is
closer to the "firm offer" cases than to the contract to bargain
situation. In emphasizing Hoffman as authority for the contract
to bargain, one runs the risk of subordinating and even obscuring
the factor of mutual agreement clearly expressed. Reliance may
provide a good additional reason for enforcement of the contract
to bargain, and in many cases there may be no remedy for the
breach of such a contract unless reliance can be proved. However,
there appear to be no compelling reasons for limiting the applica-
tion of the contract to bargain concept to cases where reliance has
taken place, nor indeed is there any justification for applying it
at all where-as may have been the case in Hoffman-the parties
have not both committed themselves to the agreement actually
reached, reserving the privilege of bargaining in good faith over
the remaining terms.
B. The Uniform Commercial Code
Whatever its implications, the Hoffman case is precedent in
only one jurisdiction, and has yet to give birth to any noteworthy
offspring. The Uniform Commercial Code, on the other hand, is
law in forty-nine states, and is important not only for the trans-
actions which it expressly governs, but also for the myriad of
other contractual relationships which it can influence by analogy.
Indeed, evidence is already accumulating that the "general part"
of the U.C.C. is the American contract law of the immediate fu-
ture.58 This can be seen not only in judicial decisions 9 but also
57 It is of course possible to conceive of two parties each bound to the other
by virtue of the latter's substantial reliance on the former's promise, but the cir-
cumstances would then make it likely that a contract would exist (if only based
on a course of conduct) and would also make it unlikely that either party would
withdraw. In the ordinary case, an estoppel-based obligation is more akin to an
option contract. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 45, 89B (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1964).
58 Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of our New Commercial Law, 11 Vill. L. Rev. 213, 257-58 (1966).
59 E.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967),
Carroll, Clarkson & Knapp, Contracts, 1967 Ann. Survey Am. L. 405, 409-13.
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in the frank attempt of the Restatement to incorporate as much
of the U.C.C. as can be decently accommodated in what purports
to be a compilation of non-statutory law.60
In order to examine the extent to which the contract to bar-
gain might be comprehended within the general scheme of the
U.C.C., consider first the possible objections which traditional
contract law would have to its enforcement: no mutuality of
obligation; lack of consideration; presence of illusory promises;
absence of intention to be bound; "formal contract contemplated";
lack of certainty and definiteness; "agreement to agree."
It is submitted, however, that a number of these objections
can easily be disposed of if one really wants to find a basis for
enforceability. The issue of "mutuality of obligation" ("both
parties must be bound or neither is bound") has been described
by respectable authorities as merely the "consideration" require-
ment under an alias;61 to the extent that it reflects a distinct
policy, it is presumably aimed at a certain kind of "transaction
imbalance" characterized by one party being tied to a long-term
relationship, the other party being bound only so long as he con-
siders it beneficial. 2 This problem is not present in the contract
to bargain, where the parties-to the extent they are bound at
all-are bound equally.
The "consideration" requirement also appears upon examina-
tion to be no real obstacle to enforceability. To the extent that
consideration reflects a policy different from those expressed by
the other objections enumerated, this appears to be centered on
the need for a "bargain" as the basis of the transaction."3 That
requirement is met in the contract to bargain, where there exists
not a gift transaction or a gratuitous promise, but rather an ex-
change of evenly-balanced, bargained-for promises.
The next objection advanced is that the promises are "illu-
sory," and therefore not binding; this objection is also untenable.64
60 E.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 60, Comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1964). See generally, Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restate-
ment, 74 Yale L.J. 302 (1964).
01 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 81, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1964); 1A A. Corbin, Contracts § 152, at 5-6 (rev. ed. 1963); Patterson, An
Apology for Consideration, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 939-41 (1958).
02 E.g., Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693 (5th
Cir. 1924); Reliable Constr. Co. v. Lifetime Indus., Inc., 18S F. Supp. 242
(S.D. Ohio 1960). The "mutuality" approach, of course, only results in freeing both
parties from the contract; a reverse approach is suggested in Gellhorn, Limitations
on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 Duke L.J. 465.
03 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 75 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965). See
generally Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 929 (1958).
04 The "illusory promise" issue can be viewed as one aspect of the considera-
tion requirement, a case where 9egal detriment" is lacking. See 1 A. Corbin,
Contracts § 145 (rev. ed. 1963).
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The parties may not have promised to go through with the even-
tual proposed exchange of performances "no matter what," but
they have promised to negotiate with each other in good faith
toward that end. A promise to negotiate in good faith is non-
illusory in two respects: it commits the promisor to a course of
action with no condition of subsequent "willingness" on his part; '
it also results in a substantial narrowing of the promisor's options
-his freedom to withdraw from the transaction or enter into a
substitute is now restricted.66 Finally, the contract to bargain may
contain elements of both the "formal contract contemplated" and
the "agreement to agree" cases. To the extent that such elements
in the transaction are symptomatic of an intention not to be legally
bound by the tentative agreement, the objection to enforcement
would properly be raised. If the intention to be legally bound is
clear, however, then objection to enforceability based on lack of
such intention is obviously invalid. In this event the presence of
the "agreement to agree" element would be a valid reason for
denying enforceability to a contract to bargain only if it entailed
such a lack of definiteness and certainty of terms as to prevent
effective enforcement-the last suggested objection.
Each of the other objections raised above can be overcome
without necessarily repudiating the rule on which that objection
is based. This one probably cannot. Despite the efforts of some
courts and commentators to show that a lack of definiteness does
not always import lack of intention to be bound, and that in some
cases the remedy for breach may be adjusted to reflect the in-
definiteness of the agreement,67 the common law legal world is too
imbued with the hoary precept that "an agreement to agree is
not a contract" to change its ways.6
The U.C.C., however, accepts the proposition that lack of
definiteness does not per se preclude enforcement of rights under
an agreement. Section 2-204(3) of the U.C.C. 6 poses a two-fold
test: (1) Did the parties "intend to make a contract?" Since the
65 Compare the purely illusory promise made in Hogan v. Wright, 356 F.2d
595 (6th Cir. 1966) which is discussed in Knapp, Contracts, 1966 Ann. Survey
Am. L. 133, 137-38.
66 Cf. 1A A. Corbin, Contracts § 160 (rev. ed. 1963).
67 E.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 32 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964);
5A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1174 (1951).
68 "[W]e are not persuaded that renewal options in leases are of such an excep-
tional character as to justify emasculation of one of the basic rules of contract law.
An agreement to agree simply does not fix an enforceable obligation." Walker v.
Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Ky. 1964).
69 "Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not
fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."
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U.C.C. generally distinguishes between the terms "agreement"
and "contract," suggesting that the latter has reference to a "legal
obligation," the parties must have intended to create a legally
binding relationship; 70 (2) Is there "a reasonably certain basis
for giving an appropriate remedy?" As regards this second re-
quirement, two points are immediately apparent. First, the Code
is not insisting on absolute certainty, but only on "reasonable"
certainty, with the result that the court will in many cases be
forced to determine what would have been a "reasonable" term
for the open points. 71 Second, the Code is not insisting that the
agreement be "reasonably" certain for all enforcement situations
which might arise. The question posed is simply this: "Is there
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy to
this plaintiff, against this defendant, in the circumstances of this
breach of the agreement?" 72
So interpreted, section 2-204 on its face poses no barrier to
the enforcement of a contract to bargain-assuming that an ap-
propriate remedy can be devised for the complained of breach.
Indeed, in some respects the recognition and enforcement of a
contract to bargain should be a less difficult pill for the common
law lawyer to swallow than was the U.C.C.'s assertion of an even
more sweeping power under section 2-204(3), which some have
attacked as giving the court a warrant to "make a contract" for
the parties by fixing terms the parties themselves had not agreed
uponYa In the case of a contract to bargain the court would not
be required to "make" a contract for the parties, but only to en-
force as a contract an agreement which the parties themselves
had already made.
Section 2-204(3) does, however, free us from the hitherto
seemingly universal rule that "an agreement to agree can never
be a contract." In applying the U.C.C. to a contract to bargain,
then, the first question is one of fact: what sort of "contract," if
any, did the parties intend to make? To deny legally-enforceable
status to such an agreement under section 2-204(3), on the ground
that the parties did not intend to "make a contract," is to assume
that the word "contract" as used in section 2-204(3) means "con-
tract which the common law would have enforced before the
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code," and only that. This
assumption is so obviously contrary to the whole thrust of section
70 See note 40 supra.
71 UCC § 2-204(3), Comment.
72 This issue is discussed below; see text accompanying note 170 infra.
73 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report Relating to the Uniform Commercial
Code (Legis. Doc. No. 65A) (1956).
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2-204, and other parts of the Code as well, that it requires no
further discussion.74 The only remaining objection to enforceabil-
ity is whether an appropriate remedy exists; this cannot be an-
swered without first knowing the circumstances existing at the
time of defendant's breach and the nature of that breach.
Having met these requirements, it appears that the contract
to bargain can fit quite comfortably under the umbrella of 2-204
(3). Furthermore, it should be noted that legal recognition of the
contract to bargain would further a number of policies generally
favored by the Code:
1) The Code takes the position that the law should give
effect to the intention of the parties, where it can be ascertained,
if such intention does not violate some other express policy of the
Code.75 This principle is reflected not only in section 2-204(3),
where it is clearly evident, but also in the remainder of section
2-204, and in various other sections. 6
Indeed, one of the principal aims of the draftsmen was to
adjust the law to reflect actual business practice, and give effect
to the businessman's intention, rather than forcing him to conform
to a court's ideas of the proper form for business agreements.77
2) The parties to any commercial transaction covered by
the Code should be held to the standard of honorable conduct
generally referred to as "good faith," which, in the case of a
Cmerchant" (i.e., a businessman in the conduct of his business),
means not only "honesty" but also "the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade'17s If a contract
to bargain were to be enforced according to its terms, with some
remedy being made available to the aggrieved party in the event
74 Such a construction would mean, for instance, that a "one-sided" modifica-
tion of an agreement, binding without consideration under UCC § 2-209(1), would
not be a "contract" as that term is used in UCC § 2-204(3).
75 UCC § 1-102(2)(b), (3), (4).
76 See UCC §§ 2-205 ("Firm Offers"), 2-206 ("Offer and Acceptance in For-
mation of Contract"), 2-207 ("Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation,"
the so-called "battle of the forms" provision), 2-208 ("Course of Performance or
Practical Construction"), and 2-305 ("Open Price Term").
77 See generally Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 77q
(1953).
78 UCC § 2-103(1) (b). The term "good faith" as used in the UCC refers to
two different concepts. One is the idea of "good faith purchase," the other a stan-
dard of "honest" (and in the case of a "merchant," "commercially reasonable")
conduct in commercial transactions. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and
Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 666, 667-71 (1963) (the latter is "an implied term of the contract requiring
cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that another party will not
be deprived of his reasonable expectations." Id. at 669). As used throughout this
discussion, "good faith" has only the latter meaning.
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of breach, then obviously the general purpose of holding mer-
chants to good faith standards of conduct would be served; just
as obviously, if such a contract were not be enforced at all, the
Code's purpose of promoting and protecting good faith would be
subverted. In his recent comprehensive study of "good faith" un-
der the U.C.C., Professor Summers suggests that the Code im-
poses no duty of good faith with respect to conduct occurring
prior to the formation of a contract.79 But it is here assumed that
a contract has indeed been made, and the only question is whether
the court will enforce it according to its terms. This being the
case, there appears to be no reason why the Code's general obliga-
tion of good faith should not apply to this type of contract as it
does to any other.
3) Although other points could be raised to demonstrate
that the contract to bargain promotes Code policy, there is one in
particular that merits consideration because it is of a slightly
different nature: it can be contended that decisions like those here
argued for are desirable-even necessary-if the Code is to sur-
vive as a viable body of law. When the Code was first proposed,
one of the chief arguments against its adoption was that the
flexibility and potential for change inherent in a common law sys-
tem would be sacrificed for a rigid system of rules which-how-
ever "advanced" or "modern" in their inception-would inevitably
become outmoded, stifling further growth.O The drafters of the
Code tried to overcome this fear in a number of ways, one of
which was to build into the Code a number of "expandable" con-
cepts, such as "commercial reasonableness," "good faith," and
"unconscionability. " 81 Although the courts are not free to contra-
vene the express language of the Code, they must be free within
the confines of that language to reach particular decisions not
expressly contemplated-perhaps even feared-by the very men
who drafted the Code and voted its adoption.82
7" Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va. L. Rev. 19S, 220-32 (1968).
80 1 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commerdal Code
(Legis. Doc. No. 65) (1955). Professor Gilmore has suggested that the major por-
tion of any code is already obsolete when adopted, referring to this as the "museum
aspect" of codification. Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. Colo. L. Rev.
461, 473 (1967).
81 See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1963).
82 See the comment in Professor Patterson's commentary for the New York
Law Revision Commission's study, discussing practitioners' uneasiness with the
"broad provisions," and "principles and policies" of the Code:
[Tihe way to limit such vague norms is not to reject them as wrong but
to exclude them as for the present problem irrelevant. Thus if some dis-
tressed buyer of goods, under the proposed code, argues that the contract
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Before leaving this discussion of the Uniform Commercial
Code, it is only fair to note at least one argument against recog-
nizing the contract to bargain under section 2-204(3). The gen-
eral policy set forth by that section is given more particular
expression in section 2-305, which deals with one important type
of failure to agree-lack of agreement on price. Undoubtedly in-
fluenced by the knowledge that price would probably be regarded
as the most material term of any contract for the sale of goods s3
section 2-305 deals with omission of a price term. It repeats the
general purpose of section 2-204(3), stating that the parties can,
if they so intend, make a contract even though the price is not
settled; it notes some of the ways in which an agreement lacking
a fixed price may nevertheless provide sufficient basis for the
determination of price (e.g., reference to some agreed market or
other standard set by some third person or agency) ; 4 it declares
that where a price is left to be fixed by one of the parties, it is
to be fixed in good faith, it declares the court's determination of a
"reasonable" price to be binding in those cases where a contract
was intended but the price has not been fixed.
To this point, section 2-305 appears merely to reinforce the
general policy of 2-204(3), and does not contain any express
denial of enforceability for the contract to bargain. Questions
are raised in that regard, however, because of the concern of 2-305
with the fixing of a "reasonable" price. If "reasonableness" gov-
erns in every case where the parties intend to create a contract
for sale without an agreement on price, then a contract to bargain
over price is not comprehended within 2-305(1). The language of
the second sentence of subsection (1) may negate this, however,
by implying that the price will be a "reasonable" one in some
but not necessarily all cases.
A far more serious obstacle to Code-based recognition of the
for sale was "unconscionable," because the price that he agreed to pay was
excessive, the court's answer might well be that Section 2-302 is irrelevant;
a court is not authorized to engage in price-fixing without explicit autho-
rization.
1 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code (Legts.
Doc. No. 65) (1955). But see American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver,
105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 19,
191, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969) ("There is no reason to doubt .. that
the section 2-3021 is intended to encompass the price term of an agreement.").
83 Cf. UCC § 2-201(1).
84 Such an agreement would presumably satisfy even the more strict common
law requirement of certainty. See Boret v. Vogelstein, 188 App. Div. 605, 177
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1919), aff'd mem., 230 N.Y. 573, 130 N.E. 898 (1920);
compare Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co.,
235 N.Y. 338, 139 N.E. 470 (1923) (no contract despite external standard since
further agreement is still required to fix price).
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contract to bargain is contained in subsection (4) of 2-305, which
provides as follows:
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the
price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no con-
tract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods already
received or if unable to do so must pay their reasonable value at the
time of delivery and the seller must return any portion of the price
paid on account.
One possible construction of the first sentence of this provision
obviously rejects-at least in the case of a failure to reach agree-
ment on price-the concept of a contract to bargain. The argu-
ment appears to be a strong one, and is supported by the brief
reference to subsection (4) in the comment on 2-305.11 Neverthe-
less, there are at least two ways in which the first sentence can
be read to permit recognition of the contract to bargain. One is
to say that the parties do indeed "intend ... to be bound," at
least to a limited degree. That being so, the sentence does not
apply. The trouble with this argument is that it is only partially
accurate; the parties may nevertheless "intend not to be bound"
should they be unable to agree eventually on price or any other
material open term. The better argument is that, as applied to
the contract to bargain, the first sentence of 2-305(4) should be
read as follows: "Where... the parties intend not to be finally
bound unless the price be ...agreed and it is not... agreed
because the parties bargaining in good faith have failed to reach
agreement, then at that point there is no contract."
Although this construction may be more strained than the
first,sG it is submitted that neither construction is unreasonable,
because the langauge of 2-305(4) was simply not drafted with
the contract to bargain in mind. Subsection (4) merely provides
express recognition for the obvious fact that some "agreements
to agree" do not qualify for enforcement under 2-305(1), and
provides a remedy in restitution where such an agreement has
nevertheless been partially performed. Section 2-305 may also be
read to prohibit the contract to bargain, but if so, it is only by
accident, not by design. If recognition of such a contract seems
otherwise reasonable, just, and an accurate reflection of the par-
8 "Under some circumstances the postponement of agreement on price will
mean that no deal has really been concluded, and this is made express in the pre-
amble of subsection (1) ... and in subsection (4)." UCC § 2-305, Comment 2.
80 The author admits that his initial response to the question of construction
was that subsection (4) probably prevented the existence of any contract at all
until (if ever) price was actually agreed upon. Carroll, Clarkson & Knapp,
Contracts, 1967 Ann. Survey Am. L. 405, 419 n.82.
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ties' probable intention, then section 2-305 is not an insuperable
obstacle.
III
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A number of questions remain unanswered. What sort of
manifestation of intention will create a contract to bargain? What
types of conduct would constitute a breach of such a contract-
in other words, what do the very broad terms "good faith" and
"bad faith" mean in this context? What sort of remedy would be
available for such a breach, even if the law should in theory re-
gard the agreement as a "contract," creating legally-recognized
rights? And, finally is the above discussion merely an aca-
demic exercise-is there ever going to be an actual contract to
bargain?
By examining the facts of a number of relatively recent cases
in the "formal contract contemplated" or "agreement to agree"
category, one can gain some idea of whether the agreement in
question could have been characterized as a contract to bargain;
the facts in these cases may also suggest answers to the other
questions posed. In addition, a review of such decisions indicates
what effect, if any, the adoption of the "contract to bargain"
approach would have on either the future state of the law, or the
results of the cases themselves.
A. Contracts to Lease
Three similar cases involving leases provide a starting point.
At least one of the cases, Joseph v. Doraty, probably involved
a contract to bargain, and the second, Robert v. Adams, could be
so regarded. The third case, Walker v. Keith, is quite close to
Roberts on its facts, but probably should not be characterized as
involving a contract to bargain; discussion of that case will serve,
however, to further illustrate the relation of U.C.C. Section 2-305
to the contract to bargain concept.
In Joseph v. Doraty,7 a 1957 Ohio case, plaintiffs sought to
lease property from the defendant for the apparent purpose of
operating a motor rebuilding business. The parties signed a writ-
ten agreement providing for a five-year lease at a yearly rental
of $12,000, with provision for an option to renew for an additional
five-year period at the same rent. The agreement contained the
following paragraph:
87 77 Ohio L. Abs. 381, 144 N.E.2d 111 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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Second parties [lessees] hereby deposit with first party [lessor]
the sum of $1,000, to show their good faith in consummating the
lease to be drawn and subject to the approval of first party's and
second parties [sic] attorney. Said deposit will apply on the first
month's rental .... 8s
A lease was prepared by the defendant's attorney, and forwarded
to plaintiffs' lawyer, who made a few changes and returned it;
nothing more was done with the lease. The defendant later (how
much later, we are not told) returned plaintiffs' deposit and leased
the premises to another. An action for specific performance fol-
lowed.
The Ohio Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court's ruling,
held that no legally enforceable contract had been made-only
"an agreement to enter into an agreement." 9 The court rested its
conclusion on two points: the language in the agreement (quoted
above) provided that the lease to be executed first had to be ap-
proved by counsel for both parties; and the writing made no
provision for a number of other matters--"taxes, insurance, utili-
ties (including water), rights of the parties in case of default,
destruction by fire, or extent of repairs required by both parties
for the portion of the building they agreed to repair."9
0
The court disposes of this case in typical common law fash-
ion; it properly cites Section 26 of the Restatement of Contracts,
in light of the requirement in the agreement that counsel approve
of the lease."1 Nevertheless, the opinion is on its face guilty of
setting up objections to the agreement which the parties them-
selves had not raised, and which apparently did not in any man-
ner contribute to the lessor's decision to break the agreement.
Does this mean the court was wrong in ruling as it did?
The court is right in pointing out that each party did not
intend to be fully bound to the agreement as it stood, if his at-
torney disapproved of it. It appears, however, that the parties had
expressed satisfaction with the basic terms of the lease as they
had worked them out, and were waiting for their attorneys only
to insert the kind of details that attorneys are paid to provide
(and which the judge himself volunteered in his opinion)?92 If
88 Id. at 3S2, 144 N.E.2d at 112.
89 Id. at 384, 144 N.E.2d at 114.
00 Id. at 384, 144 NYE.2d at 113-14.
91 Restatement of Contracts § 26, Comment a (1932), states in part: "[If
the preliminary agreement is incomplete, it being apparent that the determination
of certain details is deferred until the writing is made out the preliminary
negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract."
92 See text accompanying note 90 supra.
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the parties had been asked at the time they signed their agree-
ment whether each regarded himself as free to withdraw for any
reason-including simply a better deal somewhere else-they both
would have probably disclaimed any such privilege of withdrawal.
At least each would probably have disclaimed it in the presence
of the other party, which may be a good rule of thumb for ques-
tions of this sort. If this assumption is correct, then the court
could have properly concluded that the privilege of withdrawal
was available only where the attorneys were unable to reach
agreement in good faith, and was not intended to extend to a
withdrawal for unrelated reasons. Unless facts material to this
question are omitted from the opinion, the court should then have
enforced this agreement as intended by the parties, the defendant
being guilty of a breach of contract.
A lease agreement was also at issue in Roberts v. Adams,
9 3
but the dispute arose out of a purchase option contained in the
document. The plaintiff's five-year lease originally granted him
"the option to purchase the said property... for the total sum of
$85,000.00, payable as mutually agreed by both parties."'" Plain-
tiff's attempt to exercise the option was refused, and be sued for
specific performance.
Although there was some disagreement between the parties
as to whether the option clause had actually been contained in
the agreement as signed, both the trial court and the California
District Court of Appeals rested their decisions on the unenforce-
ability of the alleged purchase option. The appellate court noted
that the law had "progressed" to a point where the " [h] ornbook
law that an agreement to make an agreement is nugatory" will
be moderated by an effort to avoid the destruction of contracts
for uncertainty, and to effect the intentions of the parties. The
court declared, however, that California law "firmly" held that
"failure to specify or furnish a standard for determination of
terms of payment and method of securing the unpaid balance of
the purchase price of real or other property is fatal to its en-
forceability notwithstanding any desire of the courts to be liberal
and helpful. '96 Despite the testimony of the plaintiff that he was
willing to be liberal and helpful to the extent of paying the entire
price in cash upon his exercise of the optionO7 the appellate court
affirmed, denying the plaintiff any remedy.
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95 Id. at 314, 330 P.2d at 901-02.
06 Id. at 315, 330 P.2d at 902.
97 Id. at 320, 330 P.2d at 906.
[Vol. 44:673
HeinOnline -- 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 700 1969
October 19691 ENFORCING THE CONTRACT TO BARGAIN
Although the court's decision may be in harmony with Cali-
fornia decisions generally, other courts have held otherwise,9 8 and
it is tempting to argue that the plaintiff should have been entitled
to a decree of specific performance, conditioned on his paying cash
for the property, on the theory that the defendant could not rea-
sonably complain if he received the best possible terms of pay-
ment. It is possible, however, that due to tax considerations full
payment in cash would not have been completely satisfactory to
the defendant.99 If so, there might still have been a contract to bar-
gain. The plaintiff, to be entitled to a remedy, would have to show
that the defendant was acting in bad faith by refusing to sell be-
cause he had changed his mind, received a better price elsewhere,
or had been moved by a consideration unrelated to the attempt to
agree upon a payment method satisfactory to both parties.
Walker v. Keithlo° superficially resembles the Roberts case.
In Walker, as in Roberts, plaintiff attempted to enforce an option
provision contained in an otherwise valid and enforceable lease;
the option, however, was to renew the lease for another five-year
term. The property involved was a small lot, the rental originally
being set at $100 per month. The renewal provision stated that:
rental will be fixed in such amount as shall actually be agreed upon
by the lessors and the lessee with the monthly rental fixed on the
comparative basis of rental values as of the date of the renewal
with rental values at this time reflected by the comparative busi-
ness conditions of the two periods.' 01
Plaintiff attempted to exercise the option, but the parties were
unable to agree on a figure for the rent. Plaintiff sought specific
performance, and the Chancellor, acting upon the verdict of an
advisory jury, granted the requested relief, fixing the rental for
the renewal term at $125 per month.
In reversing this decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
noted that there was no Kentucky decision in point, and that
decisions in other jurisdictions were "in hopeless conflict."102
Casting a disapproving eye on the parties' failure simply to state
a figure for the renewal term's rent, 1 3 the court went on to note
98 See 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 64 (rev. ed. 1963).
09 Cf. Thompson-McLean, Inc. v. Campbell, 261 N.C. 310, 134 S.E.2d 671
(1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 110-12 infra.
100 382 S.V.2d 198 (Ky. 1964).
101 Id. at 199.
102 Id.
103 "[RIental in the ordinary lease is a very uncomplicated item.... It, or
a method of ascertaining it, can be so easily fixed with certainty. From the stand-
point of stability in business transactions, it should be so fixed." Id. at 199. This
somewhat peevish tone recurs later:
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 701 1969
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I
that the language was ambiguous, and might be viewed either as
an agreement to agree, or as an agreement that the rent should
be fixed according to the standard referred to in the lease. In
either event, the court held, the term was unenforceable. If viewed
as an agreement to agree, "an agreement to agree simply does not
fix an enforceable obligation." 04 If viewed as referring to an ob-
jective standard, it would still fail because the standard was itself
too vague to provide the missing figure.
It can easily be argued that the court should have held the
agreement enforceable and upheld the Chancellor's findings as to
the rent for the renewal term. Many courts would take this
view;' 05 as we have seen, the Uniform Commercial Code in sec-
tion 2-305 provides for such relief in an analogous situation. 10 6
Under this approach, it then would not matter whether the pro-
vision in question was to be regarded as an agreement to agree,
or an agreement to fix price by reference to specific external fac-
tors. In either case, the court would determine a "reasonable
price" at the time (and place, presumably) for delivery.
This analysis of the contract, however, would not make it a
"contract to bargain." As discussed above, the essence of a con-
tract to bargain is that it binds each party only to negotiate in
good faith and to refrain from withdrawing for an unrelated rea-
son; it does not bind the parties to a "reasonable agreement" in
the event that actual agreement cannot be reached by good faith
negotiation. If the renewal option in Walker were really to be
regarded as a "contract to bargain," however, it appears that the
result might well have been the same, since the parties were ap-
parently unable to agree on a figure for the renewal. The court
would have had to consider the intention of the parties on these
points, of course, in order to determine the proper characteriza-
tion of the contract. Assuming the court would have been recep-
tive to any of the approaches outlined above, the "reasonable
price" approach of section 2-305 might well have been the most
appropriate, since the plaintiff had already been in possession for
Courts are called upon not to enforce an agreement or to determine what
the agreement was, but to write their own concept of what would consti-
tute a proper one. Why this paternalistic task should be undertaken is
difficult to understand when the parties could so easily provide any num-
ber of workable methods by which rents could be adjusted. As a practical
matter, courts sometimes must assert their right not to be imposed
upon....
Id. at 204. Should a surgeon therefore undertake to remove the cancerous lungs
only of certified non-smokers?
104 Id. at 201.
105 See cases cited at 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 97 n.42 (rev. ed. 1963).
106 UCC § 2-309(1)(b).
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five years and had probably relied on renewal. That the parties
had referred to external factors, at least suggests that they had
contemplated a "reasonable" rental, in light of prevailing eco-
nomic conditions at the time of renewal. 10 7
B. Brokerage Contracts
Thompson-McLean, Inc. v. Campbell08 involved a contract
between a broker and several co-tenants of a business property.
The broker, in an "exclusive sales agency contract," was granted
the right for a four-month period to sell the property at a stated
price. It was agreed that the broker was to be entitled to a five
per cent commission if he procured a purchaser, even if the prin-
cipals were unable or unwilling to complete the sale. However, the
agreement contained a provision that one of the sellers, P. L.
Campbell, would accept no more than twenty-nine per cent of the
price of his share of the property in cash as a down payment on
the sale. Campbell's purpose was to minimize the tax impact of
the sale. Plaintiff broker found a buyer willing to pay the total
price, who offered to buy Campbell's share for twenty-nine per
cent in cash and the balance in installments as Campbell should
direct, with interest at six per cent. The other sellers accepted the
buyer's offer, and eventually sold, but agreement was never
reached with Campbell, and the buyer never purchased Campbell's
share of the property. An action was brought against Campbell
by the broker, which claimed to be entitled to the five per cent
commission on Campbell's share of the property, even though the
sale was never consummated.
Reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina held that the plaintiff had failed to establish its right to the
commission. Although the evidence was conflicting and somewhat
confused, the court concluded that either Campbell never fixed
his terms for sale-in which case no agreement binding on Camp-
bell was ever concluded-or he did fix such terms but they were
never accepted by the buyer-in which case the brokerage con-
tract became enforceable but plaintiff failed to earn his commis-
sion because a buyer willing to purchase on defendant's terms
had not been produced.109 The facts as described by the court
107 A similar case is Young v. Sweet, 266 N.C. 623, 146 S.E.2d 669 (1966);
here the agreement does not have the possibility of an agreed "standard" as did
the lease in Walker v. Keith; the likelihood of reliance and of bad faith on defen-
dant's part seem much clearer, however, suggesting again that a "reasonable"
rental might well be implied.
108 261 N.C. 310, 134 S.E.2d 671 (1964).
101 Id. at 316, 134 S.E.2d at 676.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 703 1969
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
are similar to those of the Roberts case. Here again, it may be
that the actual intention of the parties was to make a contract
to bargain, with the variation that defendant's duty was to bar-
gain not with the plaintiff broker, but with the prospective buyer.
Under this view of the case, it appears that plaintiff still would
have failed to prove a right to its commission, since the sale was
apparently lost because the buyer, after bargaining with defen-
dant, withdrew his offer.110
In Alaimo v. Tsunoda"' an exclusive listing agreement was
also at issue. Plaintiff broker had been granted the exclusive right
to sell during a six-month period, for a five per cent comnmission,
but the agreement provided that the sale price was to be determined
by the sellers within ninety days after the signing of the agree-
ment; the delay was to permit plaintiff to prepare a plan for sub-
division of the property, for which services plaintiff was to
receive $250 per month for a four-month period, as an advance
against the first commission earned from any sale. The plaintiff
performed the specified services, and received the $1,000 as pro-
vided. The defendants never set a price for the land, however,
and when plaintiff secured a potential buyer for $240,000, defen-
dants refused to sell for any price, notifying the paintiff of their
intention to remove the land from the market. Plaintiff sued for
damages, claiming defendants had breached their contract. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, and the California District
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the agreement, because
it failed to specify a price for the property or a method by which
price could be determined with certainty, was too indefinite to be
enforced. The court refused to use the market value of the land
as the sale price for the purpose of enforcing the agreement since
the agreement itself made no reference to market price; the court
pointed out that many owners of real property are unwilling to
sell for the market price. Plaintiff had conceded-perhaps un-
wisely-that under the agreement defendants could properly have
fixed an exorbitant price, which no buyer would have paid, leav-
ing plaintiff with no basis for complaint: "[T] his," the court con-
cluded, "illustrates the illusoriness of the contract."" 2
The court aptly stressed the "illusory" nature of the agree-
ment; the defect of the provision was not that it amounted to an
110 Cf. Landow-Luzier Co. v. Grey, 34 Misc. 2d 1061, 232 N.Y.S.2d 247
(Sup. Ct. 1962), also involving a brokerage contract, which held that defendants
had an implied "good faith" obligation not to interfere with plaintiff broker's
attempt to negotiate on their behalf.
111 215 Cal. App. 2d 94, 29 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
112 Id. at 101, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
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"agreement to agree,""' but that it was similar to the classic
illusory agreement: I'll sell to you if I want to."' If one party to
an agreement makes only illusory commitments, the whole agree-
ment is unenforceable for lack of consideration. Where the agree-
ment otherwise contains enough consideration on both sides to
make it generally enforceable, as in Alaimo, the illusory promise
remains unenforceable simply because it promises nothing."' If
the court is correct in interpreting defendant's promise to be:
"We'll state a price for our property if we want to sell it," then
the decision is obviously correct.
The facts as stated, however, suggest that the promise of the
defendants should be interpreted as a promise to state a price,
with no implied qualification of willingness to sell. As noted above,
the agreement itself recites that the decision on price is being de-
layed, not because the defendants were deciding whether or not to
sell, but because they were awaiting the results of the plaintiff's
study of the situation."" Should the court have held the defendant
liable if the plaintiff had been able to find a buyer at a judicially
determined "reasonable" price?
If the approach of U.C.C. Section 2-305(3) were to be em-
ployed, the answer would clearly be yes; it states: "When a price
left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of the parties fails to
be fixed through fault of one party, the other may at his option
treat the contract as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price."
This would appear to include the case where the price is to be
fixed by one party who is at fault in failing to so fix it; the Code
declares that the price may then properly be fixed at a "reason-
able" figure.
Can the argreement in Alaimo be properly viewed as a con-
113 The court so characterizes it. Id. at 99, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 808-09.
114 See 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 145 (rev. ed. 1963).
11N See note 64 supra. The writer has elsewhere suggested that an illusory
promise should be good consideration if consciously bargained for. The real defect
of such a promise is that it is itself unenforceable, not that it necessarily makes a
"real" promise given in exchange also unenforceable. See Knapp, Contracts, 1966
Ann. Survey Am. L. 133, 136-33.
116 A similar analysis might be made of the facts in Professional Facilities
Corp. v. Marks, 373 Mich. 673, 131 N.V.2d 60 (1964), involving an agreement to
pay a finder's fee for investment funds to be procured by plaintiff for defendant's
projected nursing home. Defendant agreed to pay a stated percentage on all funds
"requested or accepted" by him, but never "requested or accepted" any. In that
case, however, a promise to request some amount probably should not have been
implied, because plaintiff could not reasonably have understood defendant to be
fully committed to the enterprise. In the Alaimo case, however, plaintiff may well
have understood that defendant was committed to proceeding with the sale, so
that the only decision left to be made by the defendant was what the sale price
should be, not whether there should be any sale at all.
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tract to bargain? A contract to bargain only binds the parties to
negotiate further, and does not guarantee agreement or a court-
fixed "reasonable" term in the event of failure to reach such
agreement. A brokerage contract-not a contract of sale is in-
volved here, and it would be improper to say that this brokerage
contract binds the owner to sell the land at a reasonable price,
the result dictated if the broad principles of 2-305 were to apply.
It seems perfectly proper, however, to suggest that the contract
binds the owner to pay a broker's commission if a buyer can be
found who will pay a reasonable price-at least if the seller has
refused to state in good faith what price he would accept. Viewed
in this light, the brokerage contract really is a contract to bargain,
in a limited sense; it is a contract to commence bargaining. It does
not necessarily bind the buyer to continue negotiating toward a
sale, but it does bind him at least to state, in good faith, his initial
negotiating position. If he refuses, it seems reasonable to hold him
liable for a commission based on a reasonable asking price, if a
would-be buyer at that price was or could have been procured.
117
C. Contracts for Services
The following three cases serve to clarify the line between
the contract to bargain and transactions which closely resemble
but do not actually fall within that category.
Wagner v. Rainier Mfg. Co.11 centered on an alleged con-
tract binding the defendant to employ the plaintiff as a logger.
The latter had initially notified the defendant of a prospective
sale of timber by the Federal Government; plaintiff had also of-
fered to build the necessary roads, and cut and haul the lumber
for a stated price per thousand board feet of logs. After sale of
timber to defendant, plaintiff submitted a written proposal offer-
ing to do the job at the previously specified price. A meeting was
held at which no agreement was reached, and plaintiff eventually
asked the defendant's agent for some "assurance" that he had the
job. The defendant then wrote plaintiff a letter, stating that his
bid was considered "favorable," and adding:
We will have our attorney draw up a contract covering points
generally outlined in your Plywood Products Timber Company
contract.
117 The conclusion reached in the text can be resisted on the ground that
plaintiff's services in making the survey were separately compensated. However,
plaintiff is not seeking to be compensated for those services, but rather for pro-
curing a buyer for the property.
118 230 Ore. 531, 371 P.2d 74 (1962).
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We shall need a performance bond, and no doubt a financial
statement. However, we can discuss these points later.
This memo will give you an assurance that we will work out
this matter with you subject to such points as our attorney brings
up.110
A month later Wagner received a second letter from the defendant
informing him that another logger had been given the job. 20
Wagner then brought an action for damages, claiming a breach
of contract. The trial judge submitted the issue of contract vel
non to the jury, denying defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict; the verdict and judgment were for plaintiff.
In reversing, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the
writings exchanged by the parties clearly revealed the absence of
a contract, the defendant's acceptance not being definite and un-
equivocal. The mere reference to plaintiff's bid as "favorable"
was ambiguous, and the reference to financial statements and
other points which defendant's attorney might "bring up" indi-
cated that final agreement was to be conditioned on such factors.
This all may be so. It is difficult, however, to ignore the
following statement in Justice Rossman's concurring opinion:
"The plaintiff's bid was never accepted even though the defendant
evidently sought to create in him false hopes while it was nego-
tiating a contract with someone else." 1 The plaintiff probably
wished to know with some degree of certainty that his offer was
going to be accepted so that he could begin making necessary
arrangements for the work to be done, possibly incurring sub-
stantial expenses in connection therewith. If the plaintiff asked
for such "assurance" in writing, and the defendant responded with
a letter stating in part, "This memo will give you an assurance
that we will work out this matter with you subject to such points
as our attorney brings up," might the plaintiff interpret that
letter as giving him the requested assurance? And might he then
incur substantial expenses on the assumption that his only risk
of losing the contract would be a failure to reach agreement with
Rainier's attorney on the details of the contract? It is submitted
that both of these questions be answered in the affirmative. Should
the defendant then be liable if in bad faith it awards the job to
111 Id. at 535-36, 371 P.2d at 76.
120 1 regret to advise you that we have arranged with other parties to contract
the logging of the timber we purchased. .... We wish to state that your
bid was favorable and that our decision was enfluenced [sic] by our hav-
ing had many years of satisfactory dealings with the parties engaged.
Id. at 536-37, 371 P.2d at 76-77.
121 Id. at 645, 371 P.2d at 80.
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someone else, for some reason entirely unconnected with the pro-
cess of negotiating a contract with the plaintiff? The only difficult
question is whether the plaintiff's relief should be confined to reli-
ance damages, or should extend to the whole expectation on the
contract as well; we shall return to this point below.12
Oil Trading Associates, Inc., v. Texas City Refining, Inc.,23
by contrast, presents little or no opportunity for hand-wringing
over the plight of the plaintiff, but does offer a chance to define
the contract to bargain with greater precision. Plaintiff had been
employed as exclusive agent for the sale of the entire output of
defendant's oil refinery. The contract apparently was for an in-
definite term, but it contained the following clause:
This contract shall terminate on or upon any date after December
31, 1953 upon twelve months' written notice by either party to the
other, provided that prior to the giving of such notice the parties
have not been able, within a period of not more than ninety days
of negotiations, to agree upon a renewed or revamped contract or
a mutually satisfactory termination date.124
When the contract had been in force for slightly more than a
year, the defendant wrote plaintiff a letter calling for commence-
ment of negotiations "looking toward agreement upon a renewed or
revamped contract, '12 5 in accordance with the paragraph quoted
above. There was apparently only one meeting between the
parties' officers; at any rate, no "renewed or revamped" contract
was agreed on, and a year's notice of termination was sent by
defendant at the end of the ninety-day period following the first
letter. Admitting that no new agreement had been reached, plain-
tiff nevertheless brought suit claiming compensation from the de-
fendant on the theory that the quoted language imposed on the
defendant a duty to bargain in good faith toward a revised agree-
ment, failure to do so invalidating the notice of termination.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that no
substantial issue of fact existed.
Assuming, for the purpose of the motion, that no meaningful
122 It might be noted that the Wagner case contains some of the features of
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., since it too is somewhat open to analysis as
being only binding "one way"--against defendant Rainier, but not against plaintiff
Wagner had the latter chosen to back out. Wagner, however, sent a contract form
along with his letter requesting assurances; it seems reasonable to suggest that he
too should have been bound in good faith to negotiate a contract with Rainier
along the general lines of that submitted contract. Id. at 541, 371 P.2d at 78,
describing the contract submitted.
123 199 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1962).
124 Id. at 830.
125 Id.
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negotiations had taken place during the period in question, the
United States District Court nevertheless granted the defendant's
motion, basing its decision upon a finding that the contract by its
terms imposed no such duty to bargain in good faith, and also
upon the observation that agreements to negotiate, in ordinary
commercial situations, are "unenforceable." 2 " As to the former
point, the clause in question merely afforded a time during which
renewal terms might be discussed "if both sides are desirous of
entering into negotiations," in order to avoid a summary dismissal
"without advance warning and without opportunity for negotia-
tion." Were the court to adopt plaintiff's suggestion that the
contract imposed an obligation to negotiate in good faith, it would
be "rewriting the contract," something which the court "obviously
cannot do.' 27
The court's disposition of the case is a sensible one. Arguably,
the reference to the parties being "able" to renegotiate the con-
tract implies some duty to do so. However, negotiation resulting
only in a different "mutually satisfactory termination date" was
an equally permissible alternative to renewal, which seems to
negate the idea that the clause was designed to push the parties
toward a continuing, if altered, relationship. It should not have
been necessary to endorse the general proposition that an agree-
ment to negotiate is per se unenforceable in order to decide this
case for the defendant; the court may well have been right in
concluding that in any event no such duty was intended by this
contract.
In Sandeman v. Sayres128 plaintiff sued for a bonus claimed
to be due under his contract of employment as national sales
manager for defendant, a seller of "do-it-yourself" furniture.
After providing for a $750 monthly salary, the agreement in
question, a letter drafted by plaintiff (perhaps to demonstrate his
enthusiasm for defendant's operation), contained the following:
Commission and/or Bonus. A suitable incentive in this category
will be paid you and will be decided upon, after the first three (3)
months of our marketing operations of Sayrecrest products, com-
mencing July 1st, 1953. This period of time is specified to enable
us to properly evaluate the market and acceptability of our prod-
ucts. Such commission and/or bonus arrangement, will be in addi-
tion to the salary stated above.129
After plaintiff had been in defendant's employ for three months,
120 Id. at 831.
127 Id.
128 50 Wash. 2d 539, 314 P.2d 428 (1957).
120 Id. at 640, 314 P.2d at 428.
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he broached the subject of his "bonus and/or commission," but it
was "mutually agreed" that the discussion was "premature."1so3
Plaintiff's employment was eventually terminated (also by mutual
agreement) after about a year, during the latter part of which
he also served as a commissioned sales agent. He never received
any commission or bonus with respect to his services as national
sales manager, and during the entire period of his employment the
company failed to show a profit, although it did have sales of over
$200,000. Plaintiff sued to recover an amount equal to two and
one-half per cent of such gross sales, as a "suitable, fair and
reasonable bonus or commission.' 31 The trial court found for
plaintiff on all issues and awarded him judgment for the sum
requested.
In reversing this decision, the Washington Supreme Court
suggested a variety of reasons why the plaintiff might have no
right to recover, pointing out that an agreement may fail to im-
pose liability because it is too indefinite, illusory, or because it is
only an agreement to agree, which requires a further meeting of
the minds of the parties before it can be complete and enforceable.
Apparently relying on the testimony of the plaintiff that the
phrase "will be decided upon" required mutual agreement, the
court settled on the third suggested reason, and found an invalid
agreement to agree.132
It is easy to find fault with the decision, since the court itself
recognized that judgment could be rendered for a reasonable
amount "if the parties had definitely and finally agreed that a
bonus would be paid and that the amount, within reasonable
limits, was to be determined later, and services were rendered in
reliance thereon." Unless strong emphasis is placed on construing
the writing against its drafter, the agreement in question is open
to the reasonable construction that the parties had in fact so
agreed. ("A suitable incentive... will be paid you.... Such com-
mission... will be in addition to the salary stated above.")"'3
The hard question is whether the Sandeman agreement falls
into the category of a contract to bargain, or whether it is even
stronger, binding the employer to pay a reasonable sum as deter-
mined by the court in the absence of actual agreement by the
parties. The only stated reason for the delay in fixing the amount
of the bonus was the need to evaluate "the market and accept-
ability" of the employer's products. The writer would suggest that
130 Id.
131 Id. at 541, 314 P.2d at 429.
132 Id. at 543, 314 P.2d at 430.
183 Id. at 540, 314 P.2d at 428. See also cases cited in 1 A. Corbin, Contracts
97 n.39 (rev. ed. 1963),
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the agreement should be viewed as imposing a binding obligation
to pay some amount as a bonus (either negotiated in good faith or
fixed by the court), since the bonus decision is postponed until
after the services leading to the bonus have, to a substantial
degree, been rendered.13 4 If the decision on a bonus rate had been
postponed until a date subsequent to the making of the agreement,
but prior to performance, then a contract to bargain could have
resulted; failure to agree on the bonus rate would then have been
a "deal-upsetting" point, releasing either party at will, but giving
the plaintiff no cause of action for breach.
D. Contracts for Sale of a Business and Related Matters
The discussion to this point has sought to show that judicial
recognition of the contract to bargain, as a preliminary stage to
the formation of the ultimate contract, would probably change the
outcome of a significant number of cases. One can only speculate,
of course, as to how many claims stemming from the bad faith
breach of a contract to bargain were never pressed to litigation,
simply because of the seemingly impenetrability of the law in
this area. In the class of cases in which recognition of the con-
tract to bargain would not alter the result, it would nonetheless
have a salutary effect, permitting the court to place greater em-
phasis on policy factors which have had relatively little notice in
the opinions.
Hammond & Taylor, Inc. v. Duffy Tingue Co. 131 involved a
contract for the sale of the assets and good will of defendant
corporation's oil distributing business. The agreement of sale,
drawn by defendant's agent without the aid of an attorney, pro-
vided that the seller would "cooperate with the Purchaser in the
takeover of the business operation and handling of the accounts
involved, even to the extent of [causing seller's president, Tingue,
to enter] ... the employ of the Purchaser on terms to be mutu-
ally agreed on.' 136 The agreement was never carried out because
of a dispute that arose over the buyer's demand for an escrow
arrangement, insuring the president's faithful performance of his
contemplated duties. Plaintiff brought suit for reformation of the
contract 37 and return of a $2,500 deposit made in connection with
the execution of the agreement.
134 Compare 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 99 (rev. ed. 1963) discussing quasi-
contractual remedy where plaintiff's performance is complete.
135 39 Del. Ch. 174, 161 A.2d 238 (Ch. Ct. 1960).
136 The agreement actually provided only that defendant seller would enter
the employ of plaintiff; the agreement was reformed at trial in the manner indi-
cated in the text. Id. at 176, 161 A.2d at 239.
137 39 Del. Ch. 174, 161 A.2d 238 (Ch. Ct. 1960).
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While there was some evidence that the parties had later
orally agreed on the terms of the proposed employment agreement,
this issue was resolved against the defendant," 8 the court finding
the agreement not binding and awarding plaintiff a return of its
deposit. The provision in question was "almost the classic example
of a legally unenforceable provision because it is nothing but an
agreement to agree in the future without any reasonably objective
controlling standards provided."'18 9
All parties stated, and the court obviously agreed, that con-
tinued association of the seller's president with the business was of
vital importance to the buyer, which was acquiring good will as
well as other assets. The terms on which that association was to
continue presumably were also of vital importance to Mr. Tingue
himself, and by inference to the seller, a corporation over which he
appears to have exercised control. Thus it might appear that this
arrangement was at most a contract to bargain, since the un-
resolved points were too important to leave to court determination
in the event of good faith disagreement. Even if it had been con-
sidered a contract to bargain, however, the result in the case
would very likely have been the same, since the Chancellor ap-
peared to find that the parties had simply been unable to reach
agreement. Furthermore, "no bad faith on either side" was
found.14 ° While bad faith in connection with a contract to bargain
may be different in application from bad faith in the context of an
"agreement to agree," the court at least considered the merits of
the parties' conduct during their attempts to reach agreement. If
the court had considered the possibility of a contract to bargain,
however, it might have devoted more attention to the question of
the parties' good faith, and the issue might not have been rele-
gated to a ten-word sentence in a two-page opinion.
Betty Lee Shoes, Inc. v. Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd.'41 also in-
volved an employment contract in connection with a sale of assets,
but the proposed agreement was important to the principals for
reasons quite different from those in the Hammond case. Sam
Lichenstein was the owner of virtually all the capital stock of
Betty Lee Shoes, a corporation which owned and operated shoe
stores in Austin, Texas. Lichenstein entered into negotiations for
the sale of Betty Lee's assets to defendant, Karl's Shoe Stores.
138 The court concluded that the terms of employment and hours per day had
not been agreed upon, finding against the defendant because its agent drew the
agreement (although it is difficult to see how one relates to the other) and because
"equity abhors a forfeiture." Id. at 177, 161 A.2d at 240.
139 Id. at 176, 161 A.2d at 239.
140 Id. at 177, 161 A.2d at 240.
141 293 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Karl's was willing to pay a total of $115,000 for the business,
but insisted that $60,000 of this total be allocated to a five-year,
$1,000 per month "non-cancellable" employment agreement with
Mr. Lichenstein, in order that the sums so paid could be treated
for income tax purposes as business expenses. When initial agree-
ment was reached, the parties signed two documents, one for the
sale of the assets, the other providing generally for an employment
contract which was to be entered into if the sale of assets were
consummated. 42 Although the parties continued to negotiate the
terms of the employment contract, they apparently never reached
a final agreement; Lichenstein was most concerned that he be
protected against any arbitrary cancellation by the buyer, while
the buyer was becoming more and more concerned with achieving
the desired tax status for the sums to be paid as salary to Lichen-
stein. The buyer eventually withdrew from negotiations and stated
that the deal was off. Betty Lee, Lichenstein and the other stock-
holders of Betty Lee brought suit for damages in United States
District Court. The trial judge, without opinion, granted summary
judgment for defendant.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the
decision, addressed itself principally to two questions: whether
the signed document referring to the proposed employment agree-
ment was sufficiently definite to be enforceable, and, if not,
whether any enforceable agreement on the matter had subse-
quently been reached. Holding against plaintiff on both points, the
court pointed to a number of deficiencies in the initial agreement
(failure to specify duties, place of performance, and amount of
time to be devoted) and stated that the writing was only an
agreement to make a contract.
It is impossible to judge the factual issues from the opinion,
although some of the facts alleged suggest a fair amount of pres-
sure and sharp practice by the defendant, resulting in consider-
able hardship to the plaintiff. 4 It is by no means clear, however,
that characterization of this transaction as a contract to bargain
would necessarily have changed the result of the case. The court
stresses the fact that the tax treatment of the purchase price was
of the utmost importance to the buyer. This was known to the
seller from the start, and the deal fell through apparently because
the buyer was unable to get agreement on the type of contract he
deemed necessary for tax purposes. 4 If this had been a contract
142 Id. at 430-32.
143 Id.
144 Cf. Roberts v. Adams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 312, 330 P.2d (Dist. Ct. App.
1958) ; Thompson-MlcLean, Inc. v. Campbell, 261 N.C. 310, 134 SE.2d 671 (1964).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
HeinOnline -- 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 713 1969
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [
to bargain, the court might have found that the defendant bar-
gained in good faith-or, at least, in faith as good as that dis-
played by plaintiff-and was therefore subject to no liability."'
What of plaintiff's reliance on the alleged representations of
defendant's agents that the deal was sure to go through? This may
properly go uncompensated, since each party in a contract to
bargain should realize that good faith bargaining is no guarantee of
agreement. In relying on a contract of this sort, a businessman
takes the calculated risk that if agreement cannot be reached, his
reliance will not be protected. 4 ' If the deal fails for a different
reason, however, this is not within the risk he has consciously
incurred, and he should be compensated. Use of the "contract to
bargain" device in a case such as Betty Lee would enable the
court to direct its attention not merely to the indefiniteness of the
agreement, but to the defendant's good faith-or lack of it-in
withdrawing from the proposed exchange.
A third case of this general type is Borg-Warner Corp. v.
Anchor Coupling Co., 4 7 in which plaintiff was seeking specific
performance of an alleged contract for sale of the assets of a
manufacturing business. Defendants were the manufacturing com-
pany, Anchor Coupling Co., and its chief officers and major
stockholders, Charles Conroy and Walter Fritsch. The contract
was said to be contained in letters of offer and acceptance, written
on behalf of Anchor and Borg-Warner, respectively. Conroy later
refused to perform under the contract, and this action followed.
Defendants Anchor and Conroy moved to dismiss plaintiff's com-
plaint, arguing that Anchor's original letter to plaintiff could not
form the basis of a contract, despite the later acceptance. The
letter, referring to earlier correspondence from Borg-Warner,
affirmed Anchor's intention to enter a contract in accordance with
the general terms set out by Borg-Warner, but added certain pre-
requisites. "[S]uitable assurances" would have to be given "for
the retention of the lower level executive personnel" of Anchor,
and "mutually satisfactory arrangements" would have to be made
"for the continued employ of Charles L. Conroy. ' 114 The trial
court granted defendant Anchor's motion to dismiss, on the ground
that no contract existed.
145 "The parties worked diligently in an effort to draw up an employment
contract which both would be willing to enter into-which would be 'satisfactory'
to both parties. This they were never able to do." Betty Lee Shoes, Inc. v. Karl's
Shoe Stores, Ltd., 293 F.2d 429, 436 (5th Cir. 1961).
146 E.g., Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 280 F. Supp. 616 (D. Ore. 1967);
cf. Ashton v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
147 16 Ill. 2d 234, 156 N.E.2d 513 (1958).
148 Id. at 238, 156 N.E.2d at 515.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois, two Justices dissenting, re-
versed and remanded, holding that the parties were not confined
to the terms of the writings by the Parol Evidence Rule because
of their ambiguity. The court noted that both the plaintiff and
defendant Fritsch had indicated an intention and a belief that a
binding contract had been made by the exchange of correspond-
ence. Interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
the court held that a binding contract could be found to exist-one
which was not too indefinite for specific performance, because the
"mutually satisfactory arrangements" required to be made for
Conroy could be taken to mean "reasonably satisfactory.
M 49
Two separate dissents were filed. Justice Bristow, arguing that
both the Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule barred
any reference to extrinsic evidence for the purpose of ruling on
the validity of the contract, cited the allegations and documents
included in the pleadings as proof that no agreement had ever
been reached on the terms of Conroy's employment by Borg-
Warner. ' Justice Schaefer agreed, and also pointed out that there
was no indication from the pleadings of any agreement on arrange-
ments for retention of "lower level executive personnel."' 51 For
both these reasons, Justice Schaefer argued, the trial judge's de-
cision should be affirmed.
A better case could hardly be imagined to demonstrate the
dilemma created by the common law for the judge concerned both
with justice to the parties and with well-structured legal reasoning.
While a majority of the court was persuaded by the parties' inten-
tion to make a binding agreement at the time they exchanged the
letters,152 they were forced to take the position either that the
contract was complete and binding in the absence of provisions
for continued employment of personnel, including the second-
largest stock-holder, or that the whole agreement was binding and
enforceable-even specifically enforceable--despite the failure of
buyer and seller to reach final agreement on the terms of con-
tinued employment. As Justice Schaefer points out, the selling
company must have been concerned with the welfare of those
personnel, and indeed Conroy himself must have been vitally con-
14, If the parties cannot agree, proof of Conroy's present terms of employment,
of the prevailing rates of compensation and other terms of employment of
persons in a similar standing in similar businesses, and of established prior
practices at Anchor, would enable a court or jury to &ix reasonable terms
of employment.
Id. at 245, 156 N.E.2d at 518-19.
160 Id. at 252-53, 156 N.E.2d at 933.
151 Id. at 246, 156 N.E.2d at 930.
1 2 Id. at 242, 156 N.E.2d at 517.
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cerned over the prospects for his continued employment. Justice
Schafer, arguing against the imposition of liability, was forced to
take the position that the plaintiff should not even get to the
jury, despite the allegation that the parties believed they were
concluding a binding contract, acted as though they believed it,
and-with only one apparent exception-still believed it.
By contrast, applying the contract to bargain framework to
such a situation would permit the court to take notice of, and give
effect to, the parties' intention to create a relation which was, at
least to some extent, legally binding. Second, it would save the
court from inserting "reasonable" terms in the agreement where
the terms are of such importance that they should only be decided
by the parties. Third, it would direct the attention of the court
to another important fact in the case: Why has the defendant
refused to go through with the sale? If he has simply changed his
mind, or now thinks a better price can be found elsewhere, then
he should be liable to the plaintiff for breach of contract. If, how-
ever, he has withdrawn because negotiations have broken down on
the terms of his employment contract, and he has bargained in
good faith, then he should be subject to no liability.
Of course, the court may have properly characterized the
agreement as a complete and fully binding contract. The common
law, however, forces the court to choose one extreme or the other,
and, by directing the court's attention to the completeness of the
agreement, the law diverts attention from the good faith of the
non-performing party, which should be the most important ques-
tion of all.
E. Contract for the Sale of Corporate Stock
Several cases involving contracts for the sale of corporate
stock have raised problems of the sort under discussion. 11 3 Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co. 5 4 is of particular interest
because the court's decision is based on U.C.C. Section 2-204.
In 1955, eighty-two per cent of the stock of the Toledo,
1t53 Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1965) (parties ex-
changed telegrams which specified the stock to be sold and the price but were
expressly "subject to formalizing a preliminary agreement along lines preiously
discussed;" trial court's dismissal of buyer's damage action was reversed for trial
on the factual issue of whether a contract was made) ; Citizens Utils. Co. v. Wheeler,
156 Cal. App. 2d 423, 319 P.2d 763 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (elaborate "mcmorandum
of agreement" for sale of stock contained many open terms and a vague price-
readjustment clause; denial of specific performance affirmed); Michigan Broad-
casting Co. v. Shawd, 352 Mich. 453, 90 N.W.2d 451 (1958) [apparent oral agree-
ment on essential terms of sale of stock held not specifically enforceable; the court
cited and applied Restatement of Contracts § 26 (1932)].
154 39 Del. Ch. 453, 166 A.2d 726 (Ch. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 40 Del. Ch. 140, 172
A.2d 63 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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Peoria and Western Railroad was owned by two testamentary
trustees in Wilmington, Delaware. The trustees possessed a power
of sale, and in April, 1955, they met with representatives of the
Pennsylvania Company (a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Penn-
sylvania Railroad Company) and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa
Fe Railroad Company. While unwilling to buy all of the trustees'
stock, the Pennsylvania and the Santa Fe were each interested
in purchasing twenty-six per cent of the total stock outstanding.
Each of the two companies wrote and delivered to the trustees a
letter offering to purchase 23,400 shares of T., P. & W. stock at
$100 per share. Each proposal was expressly subject to formal
approval by the offeror's board of directors and such approval as
might be necessary from the Interstate Commerce Commission. In
addition, each letter contained a paragraph referring to "necessary
details" which were to be worked out by the legal counsel of
sellers and buyer."' Acceptance of the offer was noted at the bot-
tom of each letter on behalf of the trustees.
After the signing of these documents, formal "contracts"
were prepared. No such documents were signed, however, because
in the meantime the trustees had been approached by another
bidder with an offer to buy all the stock held by the trustees at
$133.33 a share. Some of the trust beneficiaries learned of this
offer and insisted that the trustees had a fiduciary duty to accept
the higher bid. After some initial reluctance, both trustees event-
ually took the position that the agreement evidenced by the letters
of April 15 was not binding, and offered the stock to plaintiff and
Santa Fe at a price above $133.33 a share. Plaintiff argued that
the earlier agreement was binding, but Santa Fe offered to pay
$135 a share for all the stock, and the defendants accepted its new
offer. The sale was consummated. Pennsylvania then brought suit
for specific performance or damages.
According to the Delaware Chancery Court, triable issues
of fact existed which precluded summary judgment for either
party. The major part of the Chancellor's opinion demonstrates
why the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment. Cit-
ing the Code comment to section 2-204(3)," 6 and other author-
155 Pennsylvania's letter read in part as follows: "It is understood that all
neceseary details to implement this will be worked out by our respective Counsel."
Sirfilar language in the Santa Fe letter included a reference to "all necessary details,
including a purchase agreement." Id. at 455-56, 166 A.2d at 728. There is no indica-
tion that absence of an express reference to the contemplated purchase agreement
in the Pennsylvania letter had any influence on the court's willingness to find an
existing contract between Pennsylvania and the trustees.
150 Article 2 of the UCC, by its terms, applies to "transactions in goods."
UCC § 2-102. Although the term "goods" is defined by § 2-105(1) to exclude
corporate stock "investment securities"), Comment 1 to that section suggests that
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ity,1'7 the court expressed the opinion that the statute was in-
tended to apply not only where "minor" terms were left open,
but also where the terms were important, the only question being
whether the parties intended "to make a contract." Although the
facts were in dispute, there was sufficient evidence of intention to
create a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties had in-
tended, by signing the April 15 letter agreement, to "make a con-
tract."
That being so, the only remaining obstacle to application of
U.C.C. Section 2-204(3) was finding "a reasonably certain basis
for giving an appropriate remedy." Defendant argued that the
agreement was too indefinite to allow any "appropriate relief," but
the court reasoned that the "definiteness" problem did not pre-
clude awarding relief. Since the plaintiff had indicated its willing-
ness to be satisfied with a damage remedy, a contract too in-
definite for specific performance might still be susceptible of
enforcement by means of damages. The court presumably meant
to imply that an appropriate remedy for the plaintiff would be
the standard "expectation remedy"-the difference between "con-
tract price" ($100 a share) and "market price." ' If the sale
price should be considered the "market price," plaintiff's prospec-
tive remedy would exceed $800,000, a figure which plaintiff, at
least, would undoubtedly have characterized as "appropriate."
There is no need to quarrel with the outcome of the de-
cision. 159 Notice, however, the extent to which the court-even
particular sections of article 2 should by analogy apply to cases involving invest-
ment securities, when "the reason of that section makes such application sensible"
and the case is not covered by article 8. This case would thus appear to have
been an appropriate one for such an application of § 2-204(3).
157 Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 576 (1950).
158 Cf. UCC § 2-713 ("Buyer's Damages for Non-Delivery or Repudiation").
159 After the Chancellor's opinion bad been affirmed, the trustees settled the
Pennsylvania claim for $500,000, paid from trust assets. The trustees were then
faced with a surcharge claim by the trust beneficiaries who claimed breach of
fiduciary duty by the trustees, either in making the original agreement of sale
without adequately exploring the potential market for the stock, or else by failing
to act promptly in avoiding that agreement at a time when the trustees still had
the power to withdraw. The Chancellor held the corporate trustee liable for the
full amount of the Pennsylvania settlement (giving no credit for the increased
price received from the Santa Fe, the higher price being what the trustees should
have sought and received in the first place). Pennsylvania Co. v. Wilmington
Trust Co., 40 Del. Ch. 567, 186 A.2d 751 (Ch. Ct. 1962), aff'd sub nom. ilming-
ton Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 548, 200 A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1964). On
appeal, the trustee's negotiations for a buyer, before the original agreement with
Pennsylvania and Santa Fe, were held to be proper. The trustee then petitioned
for reargument, arguing that the original agreement was fully binding when made,
and could not have been avoided thereafter without liability. The court pointed
out, however, that the agreement was probably not binding until it had been rati-
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with the aid of the Uniform Commercial Code-was trapped by
the all-or-nothing dichotomy of the law of contract. The language
is clearly wrong; the result is clearly right. In order to hold de-
fendants liable for breaking a binding contract with plaintiff, the
court had to cite the letter agreement between the parties as
evidence of a fully-binding contract. The inescapable conclusion
is that if the parties should-in the course of agreeing on "all
necessary details"-fail to agree on some term, either party could
seek legal enforcement of the letter agreement, and the court
would decide how the "necessary detail" should be resolved. Note,
however, that the letter agreement contained just four terms:
the price; the subject matter of the sale; the identities of the
parties; and the "understanding" that the T., P. & W. would
continue to operate "as an independent organization." 160 Given
the multitude of points which attorneys for either side undoubtedly
would raise in the course of working out a detailed agreement, and
the seriousness with which failure to agree on some of those points
would be regarded by one side or the other, it is inconceivable that
the letter agreements should be sufficient to make the sale of stock
"unstoppable."' 161
What is conceivable, however, is that the defendants should
have been held accountable if they withdrew from the transaction
for the sole purpose of getting a better price elsewhere, as they
apparently did. If the agreement of April 15 were regarded as a
contract to bargain, the court would no longer be forced to choose
between doing justice and talking sense. Regardless of whether
the sale would have been completed, the evidence was sufficient to
show each party so committed to the basic terms of the proposed
exchange that each was bound to attempt in good faith to agree
on the remaining terms. Defendants clearly breached that obliga-
tion by their bad faith insistence on a higher price.162
fled by the boards of directors of the two buying corporations; until that time
it was to be regarded as only an offer by the trustees--an offer which was not
"firm" under UCC § 2-205, and therefore could be revoked at any time prior to
the buyers' final approval. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. Ch. 543, 200
A.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The trust aspects of this litigation are commented on
in Niles, Trusts and Administration, 1963 Ann. Survey Am. L. 379, 392-94;
Knapp, Trusts and Administration, 1964 Ann. Survey Am. L. 517, 529-30.
1o Pennsylvania Co. v. Wrilmington Trust Co., 39 Del. Ch. 453, 455, 166 A.2d
726, 728 (Ch. Ct. 1960).
161 One of the later opinions indicates that a principal point remaining to be
worked out in the agreement with Pennsylvania and Santa Fe was some form of
protection for the minority stock interests retained by the trust. Pennsylvania Co.
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 40 Del. Ch. 567, 582, 186 A.2d 751, 767-68 (Ch. Ct.
1962).
102 A similar analysis can be made of Gold Seal Prods., Inc. v. R.K.O. Radio
Pictures, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 2d 843, 286 P.2d 954 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955). Plaintiff
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Iv
Soms ASPECTS OF THE CONTRACT TO BARGAIN
A. Intention
What manifestation of intention will serve to create a con-
tract to bargain? The essential question is whether the parties
have expressed both satisfaction with and commitment to the
essential terms of the proposed transaction, to the extent that each
would reasonably regard the other as unjustified in withdrawing
for any reason other than a failure-after negotiation in good
faith-to arrive at a complete and final agreement.' The above
cases suggest that the most likely source of such manifestations
of intention will be a writing or series of writings executed by the
parties. The common law, of course, has traditionally insisted that
elaborate writings similar to those in Joseph, Alaimo, Wagner or
Hammond should be without any legal effect whatsoever.
Nonetheless, a contract to bargain should not be held to exist
merely because the parties have reduced one or more fully nego-
tiated terms-however important-to writing. The additional
element of willingness to be bound must also appear, either from
the words of the writing itself or from the surrounding circum-
stances at the time of its preparation. 64 In light of the legal and
was permitted to recover over $250,000 damages for defendant's breach of a con-
tract to purchase a motion picture to be produced by plaintiff. No formal contracts
were ever signed, although the most basic terms of the transaction were agreed
upon; the "deal" was concluded amidst a flurry of handshakes and "we have a
deal" assurances. Defendant apparently withdrew because Gregory Peck was not
going to star in the film, despite defendant's earlier agreement that Peck's appear-
ence was not essential to the deal. Although an earlier contract had been referred
to as a basis for the new one, the latter would nevertheless have been quite com-
plex; given the size of the figures involved, a court might well have found no
enforceable agreement if bargaining had eventually foundered on one of the points
not expressly agreed upon earlier. Cf. Carter v. Milestone, 170 Cal. App. 2d 189,
338 P.2d 569 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
163 An additional problem (of particular importance in the "agreement-to-
agree" cases supra note 39) exists where the contract to bargain is only one part
of a larger agreement, the remainder apparently being complete and effectual
despite a present lack of complete agreement on the remaining bargaining points.
If a breach of the contract to bargain occurs at a time when the rest of the con-
tract remains executory (in whole or part), the court will be faced with the addi-
tional problem of deciding whether the contract to bargain is severable from the
remainder of the contract. Cf. Dunlop v. Laitsch, 16 Wis. 2d 36, 113 N.W.2d 551
(1962), involving an agreement between two adjoining landowners to share the
cost of a dam designed to create a lake on both their properties, where the parties
proved unable to agree on the level at which the lake was to be maintained.
164 This is, of course, one important difference between the contract to bargain
and the conventional contract; in the latter, the intention to be legally bound need
not be affirmatively shown as a separate element of the agreement, but will be
inferred from its completion. See 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 34 (rev. ed 1963). In
the case of the contract to bargain, however, where the intention to be at least
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practical significance attributed to the execution of a written
agreement, however, it is not unreasonable to suggest that since
the parties have taken the trouble to embody their partial agree-
ment in a signed writing, the court should at least recognize the
possibility that they intended to create some binding relation. 6 '
No court, however, should lightly engage in speculation about
the possible intention of the parties; the burden of proof should
be on the proponent of a contract to bargain, just as it is on the
proponent of any contract. On the other hand, the burden of proof
should be no greater than for any other contract, and-leaving
aside such requirements as the Statute of Frauds-the proponent
should not be precluded from relying on oral manifestations ofintention.""6
B. Good Faith Bargaining
What sort of conduct will be regarded as "bad faith" in the
context of a contract to bargain? 6 7 The opinions discussed above
were for the most part not concerned with this factor; in a number
of cases one simply cannot tell from the court's opinion why the
defendant withdrew from the transaction. Withdrawal merely
because a better offer has been received from a third party-as
in the Wagner and Pennsylvania cases-seems the most obvious
case of bad faith. Somewhat less obvious, but an example of bad
faith nevertheless, would be a withdrawal, as in Alaimo, for no
reason other than a change of heart.16 8 On the other hand, with-
partially bound is the factor distinguishing the agreement from mere negotiation,
it seems necessary to have plaintiff demonstrate such an intention as a part of his
case, although such intention may be inferred from surrounding circumstances,
and need not be spelled out expressly in the terms of the agreement itself.
10 Although the existence of a memorandum of terms agreed upon may itself
have important consequences, as discussed in note 166 infra, there is a vast differ-
ence, so far as evidence of intention to contract is concerned, between a mere no-
tation of agreed-on-terms and a formal document executed by both parties.
16 In Gold Seal Prods., Inc. v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 134 Cal. App. 2d 843,
236 P.2d 954 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) the manifestations of intentions relied upon by
plaintiff appear to have been oral, no written agreement of any kind being jointly
executed by the parties. The Statute of Frauds (if applicable-the court did not
decide this point) was satisfied by a memorandum from defendant's vice-president
to its attorney, listing the terms of the document to be drafted.
167 In a recent article, Professor Summers has pointed out that the term "good
faith" functions as an "excluder," having no general meaning of its own but serving
to refer to the absence of a number of different types of proscribed conduct, all of
which may generally be referred to as "bad faith." Summers, "Good Faith" in
General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
5 ! Va. L. Rev. 195, 199-207 (1963).
16'3 The statement in the text is perhaps a bit too glibly dogmatic; there may
be cases where plaintiff can properly be held to have borne the risk of defendant's
decision to forego the transaction altogether, but not the risk of his entering into
a substitute transaction.
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drawal after substantial negotiations have failed to produce
agreement on the reserved terms-as may have been the case in
Walker, Hammond and Betty Lee-should not be regarded as bad
faith, and should produce no liability on the part of the with-
drawing party. 6 9
Consideration of the "good faith" standard for performance
of the contract to bargain suggests two related objections which
may be raised to judicial recognition of such contracts. The device
may be used to penalize a party merely for "insufficient bargain-
ing." There is, of course, some danger that a party's withdrawal
from a contemplated transaction after what he regards as a com-
plete breakdown of negotiations might later be viewed as a failure
to bargain long enough, or "reasonably" enough, thus constituting
a breach of contract. Plaintiff, however, bears the burden of
proof both as to the existence of a contract and as to its breach.
In the absence of any additional factors to indicate bad faith
(such as acceptance of a better offer from a third party), a court
might well find that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate defen-
dant's lack of good faith.
This leads to the second objection that whenever an extra-
neous factor, such as a better offer from a third party, makes
withdrawal from the contract materially advantageous to one party,
that party runs the risk of being held liable even if he withdraws
from the transaction only after extensive bargaining has failed to
produce a complete agreement. Two factors, however, seem to
minimize the likelihood of such occurrences. One is the possibility
of creating a record of bargaining sufficient to demonstrate that
agreement clearly could have been reached had the plaintiff
169 There is a statutory duty to bargain in good faith in the area of labor
contracts. See generally Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 1401 (1958). One suggested definition of "bad faith" in this context is a
"desire not to reach an agreement." INTLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F,2d
131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); see Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1417 n.57 (1958). This statutory
duty does not depend for its existence on any agreement of the parties and is
very different from the duty which should be imposed by a contract to bargain.
It may be, however, that some labor cases can provide useful analogies for the
court faced with a contract to bargain case. Professor Cox has noted, for instance,
that the following types of conduct have been held to be evidence of employer bad
faith: "Stalling the negotiations by unexplained delays in answering correspondence
and by the unnecessary postponement of meetings," "repudiating the commitments
made by the company's bargaining representative after it had led the union to
believe that he had full authority to conclude an agreement," "withholding agree-
ment upon trivial matters," "failure to make counterproposals," "[advancing] de-
mands so obviously intolerable to the union as to suggest a purpose to obstruct
negotiations." Cox, supra, at 1418-22. All these appear to have potential applica-
tion to the commercial contract to bargain.
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really desired it; second, even those courts willing to recognize the
contract to bargain will do so with extreme caution, and only
where the justice of plaintiff's claim is virtually beyond question.
These two factors suggest that a contract to bargain is likely to
be enforced only where there has been either a unilateral with-
drawal from negotiations or at least an insistence on terms so
clearly unreasonable that they could not have been advanced
with any expectation of acceptance, coupled with some demon-
strable advantage to be gained by defendant in avoiding the con-
templated transaction.
C. Remedy for Breach
What sort of remedy should be available for the breach of a
contract to bargain? No definitive answer will be attempted here;
indeed, there is respectable authority for avoiding such an at-
tempt . 70 The suggestion has already been made that the damage
remedy in such a case should extend at least to reimbursement of
the plaintiff's reliance expenditures; the plaintiff in Wagner surely
deserved no less. The harder question is whether the plaintiff's
remedy should always be confined to reliance, or should in some
cases extend to full compensation for lost expectation. 171 The
cases suggest certain factors which bear on this question:
Contract law generally imposes a requirement that damages
claimed must be proved with reasonable certainty.172 In the case
of a contract to bargain, there may be greater uncertainty than
in the usual case because of the failure to agree on a number of
terms; this may prevent the award of an expectation remedy.
In some cases, however, the main terms of performance, including
quantity, quality and price, may have been so agreed upon by the
time of breach that an expectation remedy can be computed with
as much certainty as is usually required. This would appear to
have been the case in Wagner v. Rainier Mfg. Co. Of course the
disappointed seller may also have incurred expenditures which
can be proved with certainty and could form the basis for his
17o Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (remedy
in promissory estoppel case may be limited "as justice requires"). Comment e to
this section makes some suggestions as to the application of this very vague
standard.
171 Sce generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pts. I & 2), 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937).
172 Restatement of Contracts § 331 (1932). This is, of course, only one of
several rules designed to keep defendant's liability within reasonable limits; others
include the requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability. See generally
Note, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on
Recovery, 65 Yale L.J. 992, 997-1000 (1956).
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remedy; however, the fact that he is clearly entitled to his reliance
remedy should not preclude him from instead seeking his expecta-
tion remedy, any more than it does in the ordinary contract case.
Moreover, in many such cases, a full remedy for the plaintiff
can be justified as necessary merely to protect the reliance inter-
est. If plaintiff were the seller of goods or services, and defendant's
withdrawal from the transaction allowed plaintiff to make a sub-
stitute sale of the same goods or comparable services, the plaintiff
could properly claim the difference between defendant's proposed
price and the price actually realized on the later sale. The plain-
tiff's remedy is actually earned by his reliance on the initial pros-
pect of a sale to defendant. In cases where the plaintiff is the
prospective buyer rather than the seller of goods or services, pro-
tection of his reliance interest again requires compensation for
the higher price he ultimately is forced to pay. 73
It may be, however, that no substitute purchase by plaintiff
has been or will be made. In this connection, consider again the
Pennsylvania Co. case. There is no indication of any substantial
reliance expenditures by plaintiff, and the value of plaintiff's
expectation was probably impossible to prove. If the defendant
had simply decided not to sell, and withdrawn the stock from the
market, even a court which generally recognized the contract to
bargain would be reluctant to award a remedy. However, in the
actual case, defendant withdrew from the sale in order to make a
sale to another buyer at a much higher price. Here a remedy can
be constructed based on the difference between the "market price"
(the price at which defendant made its sale) and the "contract
price" (the price at which plaintiff had expected to buy). The
remedy, although framed in conventional "expectation" terms, is
not really computed with respect to plaintiff's own expectation of
gain, since it is highly unlikely that plaintiff Pennsylvania would
have bought the stock only to resell it to the rival bidder, a com-
peting railroad. The award is better justified as based on unjust
enrichment. Defendant had acted in outrageously bad faith and
had profited magnificently; the court responded by holding that
plaintiff might recover the amount of defendant's "windfall"
profits, even though such a sum would never have been realized
by the plaintiff had the original sale been consummated.1
74
173 The point that the reliance interest and the expectation interest may really
be identical in such cases is made in Fuller & Perdue, supra note 171, at 74-75. Of
course if the contract price is more favorable to plaintiff than the market price at
the time of the contract to bargain, the expectation remedy will exceed a remedy
computed solely on the basis of such reliance.
174 Although characterized in the text as based on "unjust enrichment," the
remedy here is not based on protection of plaintiff's "restitution" interest, which
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The preceding discussion has been concerned with the various
measures of damages that might be employed for breach of a
contract to bargain. Should such an agreement ever be specifically
enforced?
Because of the peculiar nature of the contract to bargain, it
is apparent that two types of specific performance are theoreti-
cally possible: specific performance of the bargaining process to
which defendant had committed himself in the contract, and
specific performance of the end-transaction which was to be
shaped by the parties pursuant to their initial contract. It seems
highly unlikely that a court would grant specific performance of
the former type, given the inevitable lapse of time and the likely
estrangement of the parties. 7 ' In many cases an adequate remedy
will be available without resorting to enforced bargaining; a court
which recognizes the contract to bargain under Section 2-204 of
the Commercial Code would probably not regard specific enforce-
ment of this type as being "appropriate," even if no other remedy
appeared "adequate."
What then of the second possibility? Should a court ever
order specific performance of the exchange on terms which in its
opinion would have been agreed on by the parties if good faith
bargaining had actually taken place? The discussion above sug-
gests that it should not, since the parties are not consenting to a
third party's determination of what constitutes reasonable agree-
ment as to the open terms. It has already been suggested that in
some cases the essential terms of the contemplated exchange will
have been so far agreed upon that a court could properly frame an
expectation remedy in damages. In some cases the terms of that
exchange will-by the time of defendant's breach-have been
agreed upon in such detail that a court would be justified in
rendering a decree of specific performance. If specific performance
of the exchange is to be an available remedy for breach of the
contract to bargain-even if only in exceptionally clear cases-
does the contract to bargain amount to a "reasonable terms"
contract, under another name? 176
usually implies that the benefit enjoyed by defendant was received from the
plaintiff. Restatement of Contracts § 347, and comment b at 586 (1932) ; see Fuller
& Perdue, supra note 171, at 53-55. As Professor Dawson has pointed out, however,
there are some situations in which plaintiff is entitled to recover a gain realized
by a breaching defendant, and it may be that the conventional "expectation"
remedy in some cases is really based on such a factor although "unacknowledged."
Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 Ohio St. L.. 175, 186-S9 (1959).
175 This, despite a discernable trend of courts to grant specific performance
in unique situations. See Van Hecke, Changing Emphases in Specific Performance,
40 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1961).
176 See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
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Reference to Section 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code
demonstrates that there is indeed an important distinction between
the two types of contract. In the kind of "reasonable price" con-
tract envisioned by 2-305(1), the parties are bound even if they
are unable, after good faith negotiation, to agree on such a price.
Once the contract has been made, therefore, a legal remedy be-
comes available to any party who is later disappointed by failure
to consummate the exchange. In the contract to bargain case, a
remedy would not be available unless the defendant was somehow
at fault for the failure to agree. A genuine breakdown in negotia-
tions will not discharge the "reasonable price" contract of 2-
305(1); it would, however, discharge the contract to bargain.
V
CONCLUSION
It may well be argued that, whatever its disadvantages, the
present clear demarcation between contract and non-contract at
least has the virtue of certainty, and that to introduce the concept
of a contract to bargain as a half-way house between the two will
only create uncertainty, and thus breed litigation. The "flood-
gates" argument is heard whenever it is suggested that a remedy
should be made available where it has previously been denied;
this does not mean, however, that it always lacks validity. 7 7
Here there are at least two contervailing considerations. The
amount of uncertainty already prevalent in this area is, as a result
of the existing law, not inconsiderable. To mitigate the harshness
of the "agreement to agree" cases by introducing the contract to
bargain concept may indeed create some additional uncertainty
and thus increase litigation; however, the "uncertainty" would
largely concern the proper remedy for deserving persons who are
currently assured of no remedy at all. The change is not a develop-
ment to be dreaded.
A franker response, however, is that in the area of commercial
bargains between merchants, the floodgates argument is essentially
a phony one. The vast preponderance of disputes arising out of
the non-performance of commercial agreements do not end up in
court. Either some settlement is worked out by the parties, or one
side simply abandons its position, and accedes to the claim of the
other. No change in any particular axiom of contract law will
177 See, e.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969) (no wrongful death action for prenatal injuries causing death
of unborn infant). Despite the force of Judge Burke's dissent (id. at 489, 248
N.E.2d at 907, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 73) the majority's opinion is persuasive both as to
the need to "draw a line" and as to the merits of drawing it where they do.
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alter this. Judicial adjustment of contract disputes is the exception
rather than the rule, and agreements are kept-to the extent that
they are-largely because of extra-legal pressures and sanc-
tionsYTS
What can change, however, is the frame of reference within
which settlement negotiations are conducted. The threat of litiga-
tion is seldom invoked, but the probable outcome of the unwanted
lawsuit is one of the factors-perhaps not decisive, but influential
-that determines whether or not to settle, and for how much. If
the law should frankly tip the scales against bad faith in the con-
text of a contract to bargain, then such conduct might be deterred.
Even if the end result of such a development were merely an
increase in the settlements made by those desiring to escape from
their agreements, to raise the price of bad faith in this manner
seems quite in harmony with the spirit of the Code.
Having attempted to answer the principal arguments against
judicial recognition of the contract to bargain, there is one more
affirmative argument-perhaps implicit from what has been said
before, but worthy of restatement here. Recognition of the con-
tract to bargain would have a beneficial effect on "the law" itself
-upon the quality of legal decision-making and the decisions it
creates. It would represent a movement away from fiction and
toward reality in two related but distinct respects.
There is some evidence in the cases discussed above that
courts will respond to the element of bad faith when it is clearly
present. If the law persists in declaring bad faith irrelevant in the
negotiation process, the court which is faced with clear bad faith
conduct will be forced either to find a complete contract where in
the absence of bad faith no such contract would be found, or else
to write an opinion in which bad faith conduct is either condoned
or ignored. Neither of these alternatives makes for "good law,"
a judicial opinion which, by the moral and logical force of its
reasoning, compels acquiesence.
It is also perfectly clear that contracts do not really spring,
full-blown, from the collective brows of the parties or their at-
torneys. It is often difficult to say at what point each party re-
gards himself or the other party as bound. The possible variations
are so numerous that the law cannot-and should not-attempt
to fashion a different rule for every variety of subjective intention
which each party might entertain, if only because such rules would
be complex beyond any hope of comprehension, or administration.
178 See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am. Sociological Rev. 55, 60-62, 64-65 (1963).
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Nevertheless, the evidence from cases and our own experience
is that parties do often wish to register in an effective way their
common commitment to an agreement, while reserving the priv-
ilege of differing over points not yet settled. If they have made
such an agreement, the law has no business telling them their act
of agreement was devoid of legal significance. Nor is the court,
in characterizing that agreement, obliged to choose between only
two labels, "complete contract" or "mere negotiation," neither of
which accurately describes the case. If these were once the only
alternatives, they are no longer. Under U.C.C. Section 2-204(3),
if the parties intended a contract to bargain, and one of them is
found to have breached his duty thereunder, nothing remains for
the court but to determine whether an appropriate remedy is
available. If there is such a remedy, it should be awarded.
For years, the "contract to make a contract" has been as
firmly fixed in the affairs of men as the moon in its track, and yet,
because of a seemingly unavoidable logical contradiction, has been
as remote from our legal system as the moon seemed to Professor
Corbin. The draftsmen of the Code have now bridged this abyss
of contradiction; any judge persuaded to cross it will find the step
a short one, and the terrain on the far side not as unfamiliar as
might have been expected.
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